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INTRODUCTION 
By invoking the notion of economic efficiency, economists and 
legal scholars have recently made great headway in developing a new 
and unified theory of contractual relationships. 1 !Jie _key_~d"".~ce was 
the econoajsts~recognition-that-ther.e-are-circumstances in which at 
least OileJ)arty can be made better off, without making anyone worse 
off, by one party's breaching rather than performing a contractual 
promise.2 This insight suggested that long-established rules for form-
ing and enforcing contracts should be reexamined to see to what ex-
tent they fostered or hindered the efficient exchange of reciprocal 
promises. 
The law, it has been urged, should not hinder the breaching of 
contracts where the breach offers a Pareto-superior outcome.3 This 
view suggests that a contract should not be enforced at law solely be-
cause to break it is morally repugnant, a repudiation of one's solemn 
oath. Justice Holmes made the same point without the aid of eco-
nomic analysis, viz., that the common law should move away from a 
moral interpretation of contract: 
l 
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that 
you must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else. If you 
commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit 
a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the prom-
1. The best attempt to integrate economic efficiency into the fundamentals of contract law is 
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); see also R. 
POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65-98 (2d ed. 1977); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: 
An Examination of the Basis of Contract. 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). For a collection of relevant 
articles, see THE EcoNOMICS OF CoNTRAcr LAW (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979) [herein-
after cited as POSNER & KRoNMAN]. 
2. The original statements of the relationship between economic efficiency and breach of con-
tract are Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract 
Law, 1969 Du.KE LJ. 49, and Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Eco-
nomic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); see also Barton, The Economic Basis of Dam· 
ages far Breach of Contract, 1 J, LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972). 
3. A Pareto-superior outcome is one in which, by comparison to some original position, no 
one is, in his own estimation, worse off and at least one person is, in his own estimation, better 
off. See, e.g., H. KOHLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 417-36 (1982). 
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ised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode 
of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it ad-
vantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.4 
If we agree with Holmes and accept for the time being that con-
tractual relations and breach of contract should be evaluated on effi-
ciency gi;ounds, we are led to consider, inter alia, the efficiency 
characteristics of various remedies for breach. We should invoke 
those remedies that encourage breach when breach is Pareto-superior 
to performance and discourage it otherwise. There is a long distance, 
however, between simply stating this goal with regard to remedies and 
deciding which among the numerous remedies is the most efficient. 
The bulk of the scholarship on efficient remedies has concerned the 
award of money damages, and a consensus has been reached on the 
form of damages that is most likely to promote economic efficiency.5 
Alternatives to money damages have not received the same attention 
from lawyers and economists who have written on the efficiency as-
pects of contract law. For example, specific performance, the most 
notable alternative form of court-imposed remedy for breach of con-
tract, has only rarely been subjected to the same sort of scrutiny under 
the efficiency criterion as has money damages.6 Nor has there been 
sufficient attention paid to what might be called party-designed or self-
help means of achieving enforcement of value-maximizing reciprocal 
promises through, for example, liquidated damage clauses, arbitration, 
and bonding. Nor has there been enough written on the role that mar-
ket forces, such as a regard for one's future business reputation, might 
play in mitigating inefficient breach of contract. 
The purpose of this essay is to begin the development of an inte-
grated theory of contract remedies by delineating the circumstances 
under which courts should simply enforce a stipulated remedy clause 
or grant relief to the innocent party in the form of damages or specific 
performance. The conclusion, in brief, is that in the absence of stipu-
lated remedies in the contract that survive scrutiny on the usual for-
mation defenses, specific performance is more likely than any form of 
money damages to achieve efficiency in the exchange and breach of 
reciprocal promises. If specific performance is the routine remedy for 
breach, there are strong reasons for believing, first, that more mutually 
beneficial exchanges of promises will be concluded in the future and 
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. R.Ev. 457, 462 (1897). Holmes reiterated this 
theme several years later in one of his first Supreme Court opinions, Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa 
Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903). 
5. See, e.g., the articles collected in A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 1. 
6. Two significant instances are Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 351 
(1978), and Schwartz, The Cose for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). 
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that they will be exchanged at a lower cost than under any other con-
tract remedy, and, second, that under specific performance post-
breach adjustments to all contracts will be resolved in a manner most 
likely to lead to the promise being concluded in favor of the party who 
puts the highest value on the completed performance and at a lower 
cost than under any alternative. 
The argument proceeds by examining the relationship between dif-
ferent contract remedies and the costs imposed on contracting parties 
and on society at the time that promises are exchanged and during 
negotiations, if any, after the breach. A central tenet of the argument 
is that the transaction costs facing parties who have already concluded 
a contract are less, even if there has been a breach, than the costs of a 
court's resolving the dispute. 
In Part I the notion of an efficient breach is explained and the theo-
retical literature on the efficiency aspects of remedies for breach other 
than specific performance are explored. In Part II, I discuss the role 
of certain nonlegal, market forces (such as reputation) in obtaining 
efficient breach, the efficacy of self-help measures such as bonding, ar-
bitration, and liquidated damages, and then, in Part III, the traditional 
measures of money damages - restitution, reliance, and expectation. 
Part IV makes the case for specific performance as the routine remedy 
for breach by discussing its effect on contract formation costs and on 
post-breach negotiation costs. I also discuss what defenses a promisor 
might be allowed to mount against specific performance and, there-
fore, under what circumstances courts should award money damages 
rather than grant equitable relief to the nonbreaching party. 
I. EFFICIENT BREACH 
There are circumstances in which performance of an otherwise le-
gitimate contractual promise would be inefficient. Suppose, for exam-
ple, thatA promises to sellB a house for $100,000. Let us assume that 
B values the house at $11-5,000. Thus, at A's asking price, B realizes a 
consumer surplus of $15,000.7 Before the sale is completed, Coffers A 
$125,000 for the same house. Should the law compel A to deliver on 
7. Consumers' surplus is the area beneath the demand curve and above the market price. It 
is a measure of the difference between what consumers are willing to pay for various units of a 
co=odity, as measured by the points on the demand curve, and what they in fact paid, as 
measured by the market price. See H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 203-04. In the law and econom· 
ics literature, this difference between the market price of an item and the consumer's valuation of 
it is frequently said to be due to the consumer's "subjective valuation." One of the tenets of 
modern microeconomics is that in a competitive market, the market price will just equal the 
subjective valuation of only the last, or marginal, consumer to purchase the commodity. All 
other consumers, called "inframarginal" consumers, place a subjective value on the commodity 
that is greater than the market price. 
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his promise to B, or should it allow, indeed encourage, him to breach 
his promise to B in order to sell to C? 
From an economic standpoint the answer is clear. Economic effi-
ciency will be served if resources are allocated to their highest-valued 
uses while minimizing the cost of reallocation. Thus, if, as previously 
assumed, efficiency is our goal, contract law should specify a remedy 
for breach that will lead to ownership of the house by the person who 
values it the most, and should attempt to reach this result at the lowest 
.possible resource cost. 8 In this case, the house apparently has the 
greatest value to C: we know that he places a value of at least 
$125,000 on the house; B, by assumption, values it at $115,000; and A 
values it at something less than $100,000. 
It might be objected that contract law in general and remedies for 
breach of contract in particular need not serve the goal of economic 
efficiency. There are, it is true, other worthy goals to guide us in de-
signing rules of contract law.9 Professor Fried, for example, has re-
cently made out a strong case for basing contractual rules on the 
morality of promising. Io 
In what follows, I shall use the efficiency criterion to evaluate vari-
ous remedies for breach of contract. However, that statement should 
not be taken to mean that I necessarily believe that those who urge 
different standards for the law are incorrect-. At least with regard to 
remedies in contract law, I believe it to be the case that widely held 
notions of fairness and morality argue for the same sort of conclusions 
as emerge from an efficiency analysis.II To the extent that this is true, 
there is no conflict between efficiency and the other norms often urged 
in the fashioning of contractual remedies. 
There is another potential misunderstanding regarding this effi-
ciency analysis that should be dispelled here. When one invokes "eco-
nomic efficiency," one can be asserting that courts, in applying the 
usual common law remedies for breach, are motivated, whatever they 
may say they are doing, by an attempt to promote economic effi-
ciency. I2 Alternatively, one can be urging the courts to adopt the effi-
8. For example, the costs of administering the rule should be as low as possible. 
9. A selection of pieces critical of economic efficiency in the law may be found in Symposium 
on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980). 
10. C. FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
11. See Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and the Second 
Restatement, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 111, 131 (1981). 
12. This assertion has been promoted by several authors. See generally R. POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 399; Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For 
the view that the common law process is not necessarily, but only probably, efficient, see Cooter 
& Kornhauser, Con Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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ciency criterion instead of whatever criterion they have been using. 
This difference between description and prescription is familiar to 
economists as the distinction between positive and normative eco-
nomic analysis. 13 Positive economics attempts to use the tools of anal-
ysis to describe an existing set of circumstances without regard to a 
particular moral objective. An example is an analysis of the impact on 
the amount of fixed capital investment in the economy of a change in 
the rate at which distributed corporate dividends are taxed. Norma-
tive economics interjects a moral goal into the analysis and typically 
seeks to examine what actions will most nearly lead to the attainment 
of that goal. An example might be an author's argument against a 
particular tax on the grounds that it adversely affects what he believes 
to be a desirable distribution of income. Clearly the line between posi-
tive and normative economics is often difficult to draw. Moreover, 
most pitches for particular policies are made on the basis of positive 
analysis. For example, recent arguments in favor of deregulating cer-
fuin industries were not made on the basis that regulation is immoral 
or unfair, but rather on the ground that existing regulatory agencies 
were costing consumers millions of dollars and unnecessarily increas-
ing the profits of the regulated industries.14 
The argument of this paper is normative: the courts should make 
specific performance the routine remedy and, by extension, any stipu-
lated remedy that was not inserted because of fraud, duress, or coer-
cion should be enforced. 15 Those readers who desire more positivism 
should consider what follows as being the elaboration of a hypothesis, 
which, before being accepted or rejected, must be confronted with the 
relevant data. 16 
139, 141-50 (1980). A still less favorable opinion is Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common 
Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1721-23 (1982). 
13. The classic statement of the distinction is found in M. FRIEDMAN, EssAYS IN PosmvE 
EcoNOMICS 3-43 (1953). See also H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 45-46. With regard to the impor-
tance of this distinction in law and economics, see R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
14. See generally Joskow & Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUD-
IES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (G. Fromm ed. 1981). See also s. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM 2, 200-209 (regulatory waste in the airline industry), 227-28 (in the trucking industry), 
244-47 (in the natural gas industry) (1982). 
15. Economists are loath to confess to making a normative argument, presumably on the 
ground that this means that their discipline is less scientific than if their statements were based on 
more clearly falsifiable assumptions. A persuasive argument that these grounds are nonsensical 
can be found in McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. EcoN. LIT. 481, 508-12 (1983). 
16. See notes 51, 57, 63, 65, 151 infra and accompanying text for suggestions of types of data 
to serve this task. 
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Before turning to the remedies that a court either enforces, such as 
liquidated damages or compulsory arbitration, or imposes, such as 
money damages, it is worth considering what other forces society 
brings to bear on contracting parties in order to discourage breach of 
contract. 
A. Market Forces: Reputation 
The most important nonlegal market force is probably reputation. 
Although no one is certain as to its effectiveness or its power in enforc-
ing contractual performance, there is certainly a strong relationship 
between a regard for one's reputation and the decision not to breach a 
contract. For businessmen a reputation among consumers and other 
businessmen as trustworthy, fair, and dependable is one of the most 
valuable (and hardest to value) assets that a successful business con-
cern has. 17 All other things being equal, a business prefers to contract 
with a partner known to have completed his promises promptly and 
without contentiousness. This was one of the principal findings in the 
important work of Professor Macaulay.18 
Similarly, a consumer - say, someone hiring an electrical contrac-
tor to perform extensive servicing of his property - prefers that elec-
trician whose reputation for honesty and quality, among other things, 
is high. The importance of reputation in consumer-business relations 
arises from two sources: the possibility of repeat purchases and of in-
ter-consumer information exchange. For example, a manufacturer is 
less likely to breach an implied or explicit contractual warranty if by 
doing so he is more likely to lose future business from any particular 
consumer or from those to whom that consumer might communicate 
his unhappiness with the manufacturer. This suggests that, regardless 
of the law's stance on breach of contract, the value of lost future ex-
17. Consumers are also surely concerned about damage to their reputation, in the form of 
their credit rating, that may result from their breach of a contract. For the purposes of this 
argument, however, I will concentrate on the attitudes toward reputations of businessmen. 
18. The seminal work on the actual relationships between the law and business behavior is 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SocIOL. REv. 
55 (1963). Professor Macaulay found that within the business community informal, personal 
relationships between individuals formed the basis for business relationships. The formalities of 
contract law did not influence the nature or volume of business dealing, save in the most complex 
exchanges. These results are extended and updated in Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical 
Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc. REv. 507 (1977). Professor Macaulay 
did not explicitly mention the influence of reputation on business transactions, but the strong 
implication of his work is that a good reputation forms an important part of the informal attrib-
utes upon which businessmen rely in their relations. 
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changes owing to a bad reputation may encourage business not to 
breach its contracts with consumers.19 
A last, and important, category of transactors to whom reputation 
is especially important are those who perform personal and profes-
sional services. Consider, for example, how important reputation is to 
a doctor, an accountant, a professional consultant, or a lawyer. A sul-
lied reputation can have such disastrous consequences for those pro-
fessionals that they often take very great pains to protect and polish 
the public's perception of them and of their profession. It is, no doubt, 
this concern for reputation that, in part, lies behind so many profes-
sional groups' attempts to regulate the quality of their membership. 
Because reputation forms such a large part of the assets of professional 
groups, and because, therefore, all lawyers are, to a degree, tarnished 
by the bad actions of another lawyer, there is a strong incentive for 
good lawyers to specify minimum quality standards for the entire pro-
fession. It is for this reason that most nonprofessional groups do not 
undertake the same sort of standard-setting that characterizes groups 
to which reputation is so valuable.20 
These considerations suggest that reputation serves as a signal of a 
long list of desirable characteristics, in the person or business to which 
the good reputation attaches.21 The question to be considered is 
whether the breacher's concern for his reputation or a court-imposed 
remedy is the more efficient enforcer22 of contractual promises.23 We 
can hypothesize that in those cases in which the value of lost future 
exchanges is powerful, the market will be an efficient enforcer, and in 
the cases where the value of lost future exchanges is low, that court-
imposed remedies will be more efficient. Unfortunately, the world will 
probably not divide into these neat categories. The great bulk of cases 
probably concern circumstances in which competition is powerful 
19. See Nelson, The Economic Value of Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 49-50 
(Y. Brozen ed. 1974); Klein & Leffier, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Per-
formance, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 615, 620-23, 629-31 (1981). Of course, this only pertains to ineffi-
cient breaches. If it is an efficient breach, the consumer by definition cannot be any worse off 
than if the contract is performed. In other words, the consumer is at least indifferent to whether 
the contract is performed and may actually prefer breach if the breach is efficient. 
20. Leftler, Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J. 
LAW & EcoN. 165, 166-72 (1978). Professor Leftler also finds licensure to be positively related to 
strong consumer demand for minimum quality in physicians. Id. at 181. 
21. See H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 302, on the economic theory of market signaling. The 
literature on this point began with A.M. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING (1974), which is still the 
best mo~ograph on the subject. 
22. The concept of efficient enforcer embraces two qualities: promoting only efficient 
breaches of contracts and minimizing transaction costs involved in making everyone at least as 
well off after the breach occurs. 
23. In Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. LAW & EcoN. 691 
(1983), reputation is considered as a substitute for a damage rule. 
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enough to place only a minimal regard for future profitability before 
the breacher so that some additional, court-imposed measure is 
necessary. 
Even if it were true that reputation and a rule of law were substi-
tutes and not complements, there might be minimal harm in specifying 
a rule of law to hold in all breach cases, even those where reputation 
was the more efficient enforcer. This would be especially true if there 
were substantial costs involved in distinguishing the circumstances in 
which reputation or a rule of law was the more efficient remedy. This 
being so, the proper consideration of reputation is as an adjunct to 
court-imposed relief. We might then enlist reputation as an aid in en-
forcing efficient breach through other means. 
These considerations will be especially important when we come to 
consider the efficiency aspects of specific performance, most notably 
where there has been a breach of a personal service contract.24 It is 
the general i:ule that those contracts will not be specifically enforced, 
principally because of the problems involved in the court's supervising 
the post-decree performance of the breaching party.25 If, however, the 
breacher's regard for his reputation can be relied upon to guarantee 
his faithful completion of the promise - as it can be because, as noted 
above, reputation is such an important part of the capital stock of pro-
fessionals and those who provide personal services - then an objec-
tion to specific performance based on the high costs of supervising a 
personal service contract loses much of its force. 
B. Self-Help Enforcement 
Another noncourt imposed method for controlling contract breach 
is an enforcement system designated by the parties. At the time a con-
tract is formed the parties may specify what is to be done in the event 
that either of them breaches the contract. They might, for example, 
name the sum of money, called liquidated damages, that the breacher 
will pay to the innocent party; they may designate a manner, other 
than litigation, in which a dispute about performance can be resolved; 
or they may leave good faith deposits or performance bonds with a 
third party and specify that the breacher's deposit is to be paid to the 
innocent party in the event of a breach. 26 Subject to the usual forma-
24. See notes 188-95 infra and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 379 (1932); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRACTS §§ 366, 367 & comment a (1979). 
26. See generally Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983). These performance or good-faith deposits discussed by Professor 
Knoeber as a self-help method of increasing contract compliance should be distinguished from 
surety bonds. A surety bond, in the form of a performance or payment bond, is a common device 
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tion defenses, this stipulation forms a part of the contract and is en-
forceable by a court. There are, however, legal limitations on the 
ability of contractual parties to stipulate their own remedies for breach 
of contract: a court will not enforce a liquidated damages clause 
where the stipulation exceeds reasonably anticipated compensation 
and contains what appears to be a punitive aspect.27 Nor will a court 
enforce an agreement to perform specifically.28 Nor will a court be 
bormd to enforce a contractual clause that contravenes public policy.29 
There has been a great deal of reconsideration by economists and 
lawyers of these limitations on the ability of contracting parties to stip-
ulate their own remedies. 30 There are good reasons for believing that 
liquidated damages - and other forms of stipulated remedy - should 
be routinely enforced by the court, even if they appear to contain a 
punitive element.31 The reason is that a stipulation in excess of what 
in the construction industry for protecting promisees and subcontractors from losses arising from 
a contractor's inability to perform a contractural promise. Such a bond may be interpreted as a 
self-help method of minimizing losses from a contract breach and, insofar as it raises the cost to 
the breacher of nonperformance, as a variety of self-help remedy for breach. See generally J. 
SWEET, LEGAL AsPECI'S OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE CoNSTRUCTION PRO-
CESS 295-311 (2d ed. 1977). 
27. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1977); REsl"ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACI'S §§ 356(1), 374(2) 
(1979). 
28. No provision exists in the U.C.C. that grants or denies parties to a contract for the sale of 
goods the ability to contract for specific performance. Neither does the REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNTRAcrs (1979) contain any section expressly denying parties the right to contract 
for specific performances. Nevertheless, §§ 357-358 indicate that a decree of specific performance 
is solely within the discretion of the court to grant, and§ 359(1) states: "Specific performance or 
an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation inter· 
est of the injured party." Note, however, that § 359(2) provides: "The adequacy of the damage 
remedy for failure to render one part of the performance due does not preclude specific perform-
ance or injunction as to the contract as a whole." In one example of a private attempt to bind a 
party to perform specifically, the court, while issuing the contracted-for injunction, denied that 
they were bound by the contract to issue the injunction. The contract clause specifying specific 
performance was viewed only as evidence of the parties' intent. See Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. S9, 
77 So. 2d 331 (1955). 
It is also possible to contract around this restriction by specifying that in the event of breach 
the case will be referred to and the parties agree to be bound by the decision of the American 
Arbitration Association. The rules of that association allow for the arbitrator to decree specific 
performance. Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 1S9, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d S41 
(19S9). 
29. See, e.g., Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 9S7, 56 S.W.2d. 9, 19 (1932); 
Parish v. Schwartz, 344 Ill. 563, 176 N.E. 7S7 (1931); see also, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
CoNTRACI'S § 365 (1979). 
30. See, e.g., Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Non· 
sense?, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 351; Fenton, Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence, SI IND. 
L.J. 189 (1975); Kaplan, A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages, SOS. CAL. 
L. REV. IOS5 (1977); Note, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 
IOS5 (1978). 
31. In a recent article Professor Polinsky has examined the abilities of various remedies for 
breach of contract to allocate the risk of certain contingencies between the promisor and prom-
isee. Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 
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appears to be reasonably anticipated compensatory damages may well 
serve two important functions and serve them more efficiently than 
would any alternative. 
First, the punitive element may be considered as the payment on 
an insurance contract written in favor of the innocent party by the 
breaching party. This situation arises where one party to the contract 
places a high subjective valuation on performance of the contract and 
the other party is the best possible insurer of that subjective valua-
tion. 32 If the parties are convinced that the clause will be enforced, the 
contract will be breached only when it is more efficient to breach than 
to perform. Since this is precisely the result that one wants from a rule 
of contract law, this is a strong case for the routine enforcement of 
liquidated damage clauses. 33 
A second reason for allowing punitive stipulated damages is that 
these may be the most efficient means for one party to convey informa-
tion about his reliability, his ability to perform, and the like.34 Con-
sider a construction contract in which the buyer is especially eager to 
have the project completed by a specified date. Suppose that he is 
extremely doubtful of the contractor's ability to meet that deadline, 
but that the contractor is certain of his ability to complete perfor-
mance by the specified date. It may be that the least expensive way for 
the contractor to convey to the seller his conviction about his ability to 
perform is for him to stipulate his willingness to pay seemingly puni-
tive damages for each day beyond the deadline that the project re-
mains uncompleted. 3s In those circumstances, if courts are unwilling 
(1983). He concludes that liquidated damages will come closer than will any other remedy to an 
optimal allocation of risk of loss from breach. Id. at 444. I shall return to this article's conten-
tions about the efficiency of other remedies below. See text at note 77 infra. 
32. Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 11 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 554, 
579-83 (1977). Professors Goetz and Scott give a delightful example of such a case. In their 
example an alumnus of a college wishes to charter a bus to follow his school basketball team to a 
tournament. He places a very high value on being at the game, far more than the bus company's 
hire price. If the bus company breaches, however, the most be can hope to recover in an action 
for breach of contract is the bus hire price, which will undercompensate him for bis loss. The 
bus company might be willing, however, to pay the alumnus his subjective valuation of perform-
ance in the event of a breach in exchange for a payment in excess of their usual hire price. This 
excess in price could then be considered as the premium on an insurance policy against breach. 
Id. at 578-79. 
33. Of course the usual contract defenses would be retained so that if the self-help clause 
were truly inequitable it would not be enforced. 
34. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note I, at 224. 
35. This may be particularly important if the buyer's reluctance to believe the contractor was 
due to the fact that the contractor was new to the business. The contractor could not, therefore, 
offer any other basis by which the buyer could judge his ability to complete the project on time. 
If the construction market is so competitive that it is not possible for the new contractor to 
compete by cutting bis price, then his only way of getting the contract may be his willingness to 
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to allow parties voluntarily to agree to punitive liquidated damages, 
they force the parties to find a more expensive and, therefore, less effi-
cient way in which to exchange promises. "' 
An argument that has been raised against the routine enforcement 
of liquidated damage clauses is that such clauses are likely to lead to 
disputes and, because the judicial resolution of disputes involves at 
least a partial subsidy from society and because there is no efficiency 
reason for society to subsidize the resolution of these particular dis-
putes, the law should discourage stipulated damages in excess of rea-
sonably anticipated actual damages. 36 This criticism is misplaced. It 
is true, if at all, only where the court is disposed to enforce only rea-
sonably foreseeable compensatory damages. Only where the law is un-
clear about the treatment of punitive stipulated damages is there any 
inducement to engage in a dispute. If the law routinely enforced liqui-
dated damage clauses, entertaining only the usual formation defenses, 
there would be nothing to gain from disputing the level of stipulated 
damages. 
In addition, this criticism is misplaced in that the basis of the claim 
that agreements that tend to promote disputes should not be enforced 
by the law is the observation that, because legal disputants have to pay 
only a fraction of the full costs of having a court resolve their dispute, 
people tend to use courts more than is socially optimal.37 To the ex-
tent that this is true, there are two possible prescriptions for correcting 
this inefficiency: the first is Professor Rubin's policy of preventing dis-
pute-encouraging agreements; the other is to correct the manner in 
which disputants pay for a court's resolution of their dispute. I have 
already argued that there are strong efficiency reasons for allowing pu-
nitive stipulations and so there are strong reasons not to adopt Profes-
sor Rubin's prescription. A full discussion of the most efficient 
manner of paying for legal resolution of particular disputes is beyond 
this paper's scope. Nonetheless, I shall briefly return to the subject 
below when we discuss the efficiency aspects of specific performance.38 
There is another criticism sometimes made of liquidated damages 
pay punitive damages to the buyer in the event of his breach. Without this method of competi-
tion the new contractor may find entry impossible. 
36. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 237, 243 (1981); see also Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 
(1980). Another element of the argument - an element not stressed by Rubin or Telser - is 
that penalty clauses heighten the incentive of the breachee to litigate issues that otherwise would 
not be litigated. Insofar as litigation involves subsidization out of the public fisc, this increased 
incentive to litigate would, if true, increase the social cost of allowing liquidated damages in 
excess of reasonably foreseeable losses. 
37. Rubin, supra note 36, at 239, 240. 
38. See text at notes 97-98 infra. 
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that contain a punitive element: they may induce performance when 
the more efficient course is breach. 39 Consider the case in which A has 
contracted to sell B 1000 widgets at $10 per widget. For simplicity's 
sake, let U!? assume that B advances the entire sum of $10,000 to A at 
the time that the contract is formed. The widget industry is very 
highly competitive and A is a recent entrant. To get B to purchase 
from him A offered the following liquidated damages clause, to which 
B agreed: if he breached the contract, A would return B's $10,000 plus 
another $10,000. Under the circumstances, the second $10,000 consti-
tutes a punitive element of the stipulated damages in that, because of 
the competitiveness of the industry, B can adequately cover the breach 
for $10,000. Now suppose that after the contract is formed, A's costs 
suddenly and unexpectedly increase such that the costs of completing 
the contract rise to $15,000. To heighten the point being made, let us 
assume that none of A's competitors' costs rise. 
Given all of this, one might argue that it would be inefficient for A 
to perform: he will lose $5,000 and B will be no better off than if A 
had breached, had had his $10,000 restored, and had then bought his 
widgets elsewhere for $10,000. That is, if A performs, society loses 
$5,000 that it would not lose if A breached and paid B only compensa-
tory damages. But A will not breach. If he breaches, he will be 
obliged to return B's $10,000 plus the $10,000 penalty to which he 
agreed. His losses would then be $10,000. This is double what he 
would lose if he performs the contract. The conclusion is that when 
stipulated damages exceed compensatory damages, there is an induce-
ment to perform a contractual promise when it would be more efficient 
to breach. 
The argument is incorrect: A will not necessarily perform on the 
contract even in the circumstances given above. The reason is that it 
is possible for post-breach negotiations to make both parties better off 
without A's having to produce the widgets. A stands to lose $5,000 if 
he performs. He would prefer to lose any sum less than that and not 
to perform. B would like to have 1000 widgets from A or his $10,000 
to buy them from anyone else. Anything more than this will be pre-
ferred by B. Clearly, B should be willing to take any sum between $1 
and $4,999 to release A from his duty to perform. And, importantly, 
he will be willing to take this sum rather than the stipulated damages 
of $10,000. The reason is that A can prevent B's getting anything at 
all, over his 1000 widgets, by simply losing $5,000 and performing on 
39. Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 567-68. 
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the contract. Thus, A will not inefficiently perform but will pay B 
some sum to release him from the contract. 
It might still be objected, however, that any sum that A pays to B 
over $10,000 is a social loss that could have been avoided if only com-
pensatory damages had been stipulated. 40 This is, to an extent, true, 
but there is a good reason for believing that the sum will be much 
closer to $1 than to $4,999. A can always perform on the contract by 
simply taking B's $10,000 and buying 1000 widgets from one of his 
~ompetitors, whose costs, by assumption, did not rise. Thus, the 
amount over $1 that A agrees to pay B to release him from the con-
tract can only be equal to the amount of inconvenience that A saves by 
having B, rather than himself, purchase the widgets elsewhere. 
A last efficiency concern that should be raised against the routine 
enforcement of liquidated damage clauses that contain a punitive ele-
ment is that they create an incentive for one party to induce the other 
to breach the contract because that party will be better off if the con-
tract is not fulfilled. This possibility arises as a companion to the sort 
of problem discussed above in the widget example. Suppose that the 
reason for the insertion of the punitive damage clause in the contract is 
that there is some special value attached to performance by one of the 
parties.41 Suppose, further, that before completion that subjective val-
uation falls because of changed circumstances.42 The party who 
placed the initially high subjective value on the contract has an incen-
tive to induce breach of the contract because he will receive a sum that 
now far exceeds his (subjective) losses from nonperformance. 
It is not at all certain, however, that this sort of problem is weighty 
enough to argue against the routine enforcement of punitive liquidated 
damages. First, this problem of so-called moral hazard is not likely to 
arise frequently.43 Even if it does, the contractual party who is provid-
ing the insurance can protect himself against moral hazard in the same 
way that commercial insurance companies do: e.g., by requiring co-
insurance, a deductible, or a higher premium. Second, since there is 
the incentive for the breachee to induce breach when circumstances 
40. It may easily be argued that the payment from A to B is not a social loss at all but rather 
a transfer payment, whose effect is distributional but not efficiency-reducing. 
41. In the widget example, the penalty clause was designed to convey information to one of 
the parties about the strength of the other's belief in his trustworthiness. 
42. In the alumnus example in note 32 supra, the alumnus may discover only after the bus is 
hired that the starting five of his alma mater cannot play. He no longer has an interest in attend-
ing the tournament, and he thus has an incentive to induce breach. 
43. Moral hazard arises when, after the purchase of insurance, an insuree's behavior becomes 
more risky than it was before he was insured. An example is someone who stops locking his car 
after he insures against the loss by theft of his car stereo. See H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 310. It 
is worth noting that instances of inducement to breach are extraordinarily rare. 
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change, the defendant should be allowed to raise the induced breach in 
mitigation. 44 
One last point deserves notice here. The literature stresses liqui-
dated damages to the exclusion of any other form of stipulated remedy 
for breach. In theory, however, there is no reason for contracting par-
ties not to consider binding themselves to perform specifically. Natu-
rally, there are substantial costs to inserting such a clause in a 
contract: for example, consider the costs of agreeing not to contest an 
action for specific performance or of agreeing to some burdensome :fi-
nancial alternative unless one specifically performs. There has been 
only one discussion of this possibility in the literature, and there the 
principal point was that courts will hesitate to enforce a stipulated 
specific performance clause. 45 In principle, there is no more reason 
not to enforce such a clause than there is to enforce any liquidated 
damages clause not tainted by a valid fonnation defense. In the ab-
sence of legal impediments, parties would insert a stipulated perform-
ance clause when the net costs of that clause would be less than those 
of a stipulated damages clause.46 
We now have the notion of efficient breach ih hand and an idea of 
the sorts of remedies that are available through either the market, in-
dependent of the actions of the contracting parties, or through self-
help devices available as a part of the contract. 
The strongest market force is probably reputatibn. It is reasonable 
to hypothesize that the desire to avoid an adverse reputation can in-
duce some promisors to undertake a breach only where the benefits of 
that breach exceed the costs, including the costs of a tarnished reputa-
tion. Efficiency considerations also argue for the routine enforcement 
of any liquidated damages clause that is not defeated by a defense of 
fraud, duress, or coercion. The law's particular objection to penalty 
clauses is misplaced because agreeing to pay super-compensatory dam-
ages in the event of breach may be either the most efficient means of 
conveying information or the cheapest means of insuring oneself 
against losses from nonperformance where there is a high subjective 
valuation placed on performance by one party. 
These considerations suggest that a coherent theory of contract 
remedies - one stressing the efficient exchange of reciprocal promises 
and encouraging only efficient breach - must specify not only what 
remedies the court will impose in the event that the parties have not 
44. Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 588. 
45. See Kronman, supra note 6, at 370-71 (discussing Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2cl 
331 (1955)). 
46. See text at notes 118-21 infra. 
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done so, but must also indicate how it will treat self-help remedies 
agreed to by the contracting parties at the time of contract formation. 
Stipulated damages seek to encourage contracting parties to specify 
how they wish disputes resolved, and there is every reason to believe 
that they will stipulate the most efficient remedy, considering all the 
factors.47 
III. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
A. Restitution 
Legal remedies in the common law of contract remedies seek to 
protect three interests of the innocent party in a breach of contract.48 
First is the restitution interest. The goal of awarding a restitution in-
terest in damages is to return the innocent party, insofar as possible, to 
his position before the contract was formed. Thus, any benefits, in the 
form of money or property, that the innocent party transferred to the 
breacher between the formation of the contract and the breach are to 
be returned. This situation typically arises where a contract is only 
partially fulfilled. The law holds that restitution is to be made to the 
innocent party even if performance might have resulted in loss to the 
innocent party.49 
It is not entirely clear when or why courts prefer restitution to 
other damage measures. A frequently cited reason for ordering a res-
toration of values on both sides is to prevent unjust enrichment from 
breach of contract. 50 Little attention has been given to the possibility 
of an efficiency reason for preferring restitution to other contract rem-
edies. 51 One possible efficiency explanation is that, in general, it is 
extremely inexpensive to measure damages in terms of benefit con-
47. One of the most important of these factors is accounting for any subjective valuation on 
performance by one of the parties. Bargaining at the time the contract is formed is more likely 
than any other alternative method to protect one's subjective value. As I shall argue below, if the 
measurement of subjective value is attempted only after a breach, there is a strong incentive for 
the aggrieved party to overstate his subjective value and for the other party to dispute that value. 
48. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies far Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147-
49 (1970). 
49. Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485 (1818); REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 373 & 
comment d (1979); U.C.C. §§ 2-702, 2-703, 2-705 (1977); see Sanitary Linen Serv. Co. v. Alexan· 
der Proudfoot Co., 435 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970) (a laundry recovered fees paid to an efficiency 
engineer when no substantial increase in efficiency resulted from his recommendations). 
so. See REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 comment a (1979); D. DOBBS, 
REMEDIES 223-27 (1973). 
51. See generally Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the 
Partially Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 21-28 (1982) (discussing the comparative efficien· 
cies of expectancy damages and restitution; concludes that when transaction costs are consid· 
ered, neither is clearly preferable). 
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ferred, especially in comparison to the other damage measures avail-
able to the courts. 
However, despite the inexpensive nature of this remedy, restitution 
as a measure of damages will not necessarily lead to economically effi-
cient breach of contract. Consider, again, the example in which A has 
agreed to sell a house to B for $100,000 when B values the house at 
$115,000. If A knows that upon breach he will have to pay B restitu-
tion damages, A may breach when economic efficiency would urge him 
to perform. Suppose that B gives A a good faith deposit of $5,000 
when the contract is formed and that before A conveys to B, Coffers A 
$110,000 for the house. If A anticipates that the court will award res-
titution damages to B for breach of contract, A will breach, pay $5,000 
to B, and sell the house to C. Because C values the house less than 
does B but more than the contractual price, the breach does not lead 
to a Pareto-efficient reallocation. 
Nor is it the case that B can protect his subjective valuation arising 
from completion of the contract by leaving a good faith deposit with A 
that is just equal to the difference between the price he is willing to pay 
for the house and the contractual price. In this instance, suppose that 
B attempts to protect his subjective valuation by leaving $15,000 with 
A. The fact of the matter is that A will still breach if he receives any 
offer above B's $100,000. All A is required to do under a restitution 
formula is to return B's $15,000 in order to place B in as good a posi-
tion as he was prior to the formation. of the contract. He is not re-
quired to place B in as good a position as B would have been upon 
completion of the contract. Thus, the size of the good faith deposit 
that B leaves with A has no bearing on A's decision to breach. It is in 
A's interest to breach, under the restitution formula, whenever he is 
offered a higher price than the contractual price agreed upon with B. 
It is efficient, however, for him to breach only if he receives an offer 
that is higher than B's subjective valuation of the house. Since restitu-
tion offers no way to induce only this breach, it must be rejected, on 
efficiency grounds, as the routine contract remedy.s2 
52. This does not mean that there are no grounds other than efficiency for preferring restitu-
tion to other remedies. See; e.g., Mather, supra note 51, at 36-47 ("Restitution usually serves the 
liberal purpose of rectifying an involuntary transfer." Id. at 47). Nor does it preclude the possi-
bility that restitution might have some efficiency characteristics, e.g., its ease of measurement. 
Professor Harrison has recently suggested that the courts have eschewed efficiency as their guide 
in dealing with restitution losses. Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 
584-85 (1983). Efficiency argues for assigning losses in their entirety to one or the other party. 
Courts rarely do this, however, preferring instead to use a criterion of fairness to split the loss. 
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B. Reliance 
A second interest of the innocent party that damage measures seek 
to protect is the reliance interest. s3 Expenses incurred by the innocent 
party in reliance on the performance of the other party's promise or in 
preparing to accept the fruits of the contract are recoverable as reli-
ance loss when the contract is breached. s4 The purpose of this mea-
sure of damages is to prevent punishing the innocent party for relying 
on the contract. 
In the simple transaction we have been examining between A and 
B for the sale of a house for $100,000, suppose that B, in anticipation 
of A's performing the contract, hires a mover, an interior decorator, a 
painter, and so on. ss B's reliance on A's promise to convey the house 
at $100,000 has induced him to spend, say, $8,000. B continues to 
value the house at $115,000. Now comes C to bid $110,000 to A for 
his house. If A must pay reliance loss to B as damages for breaching 
his contract, then A will breach, pay B $8,000 in damages, and sell to 
C for $110,000. A has increased his profit by $2,000, and in the eyes of 
the court B is no worse off than if he had never entered the contract in 
the first place. Yet, as with restitution as the damage measure, the 
breach, where reliance loss is the damage measure, is not necessarily 
Pareto efficient: the house has not passed to the party who values it 
most. 
However, as compared to restitution, there is something to be said 
in favor of reliance on efficiency grounds. s6 Reliance may be con-
strued as an attempt to protect, and thus to encourage, the efficient 
timing of expenditures related to performance of the contract. The 
argument would be that without protection of these reasonable, pre-
completion expenditures, parties - especially those who have a high 
degree of risk aversions7 - would inefficiently wait until full perfor-
mance before incurring these expenses. The inefficiency is not likely to 
be large, however, because the cost of that waiting is likely to be mini-
mal and is offset to the extent of interest earned on the funds that 
53. The original statement of the reliance measure of damages is Fuller & Perdue, The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) (Part 1); 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937) 
(Part 2). 
54. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CoNTRACTS § 349 (1979); U.C.C. §§ 2-704, 2-708, 2-710 
(1977). 
55. Note that because these expenses confer no benefit on A, they are not recoverable as 
restitution damages. 
56. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 1 at 1267-70, 1305-09. 
57. Economists distinguish different attitudes toward risk: risk preference, risk neutrality, 
and risk aversion. It is customary to assume that most consumers are risk averse. A person who 
is risk averse will usually pay money to avoid having to bear risk arising from uncertainty, See 
H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 290.93 for a more formal definition. 
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would have been used to make the earlier purchases. If the law re-
lieved an innocent contractual party of the risk of this loss, he would 
be willing to forego the interest earned on his funds in order to make 
his expenses at an earlier date. If there are no inefficiencies induced by 
the reliance measure and if it is a relatively inexpensive damage mea-
sure to compute, the benefits of making this the routine remedy may 
exceed the costs. 
It might be objected that those with a high subjective valuation on 
performance might be induced to time their expenses inefficiently 
under the reliance measure. If it were well known that the routine 
remedy for breach was the payment of any expenses incurred in rea-
sonable reliance on the performance of the contract, then B could fully 
protect himself against breach by incurring reliance expenses up to the 
difference between the contractual price and his reservation price for 
performance. In my example, B could guarantee that a breach by A 
would be efficient by incurring $15,000 in anticipation of moving into 
the house. 
There is an efficiency problem in that, if reliance is the routine 
remedy, there seems to be little reason for B to stop at $15,000 in his 
expenses before A has performed. If he knows that the court will hold 
A liable for his reliance expenses, why should he not make $20,000 in 
pre-completion commitments? He may well have intended to make 
that commitment anyway in order, say, to have the house remodeled. 
The cost to him of re-timing that expenditure is small: the additional 
interest on the loan to effect the improvements. The result, however, 
is that the house may not now be efficiently allocated. A now faces a 
damage payment of $20,000 and may, therefore, perform when breach 
is more efficient. If C were willing to pay $118,000 for the house, then 
it should pass to him, since he values it more than does either A or B. 
But it will not if A is responsible to B for $20,000 in reliance 
damages.58 
An answer to this objection to reliance damages as the routine 
remedy is that the law already discourages B's over-reliance by pro-
tecting only reasonable reliance. 59 That is, the law will not allow B to 
pile on expenses willy-nilly so as to bind A to perform. There is no 
doubt from an efficiency standpoint that this is the proper stance for 
the law, but there are other reasons to believe that allowing only rea-
sonable reliance will still not guarantee only efficient breach. The 
most important of these is that determining which reliance expenses 
58. A more formal mathematical model of reliance and contract remedies is in Shavell, Dam-
age Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466, 473-87 (1980). 
59. REs'rATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 349, 350 (1979). 
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were reasonable and which were not is likely to be expensive. This is 
all the more true because the breachee has a strong incentive to 
demonstrate large reliance interest at the same time that the breacher 
has the contrary incentive to minimize that interest. 
C. Expectation 
The third interest of the innocent party that the law of contract 
damages protects is the expectation interest. Whereas with restitution 
and reliance the goal of the remedy is to place the innocent party in 
the position he was in before formation of the contract, with expecta-
tion damages the breachee is to be put in the position he expected to 
assume had the contract been performed. 60 The common law rule was 
enunciated in Robinson v. Harman:61 "where a party sustains a loss by 
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be 
placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the con-
tract had been performed." In addition to being the most widely used 
contract remedy, expectation has attracted the favorable attention of 
economists because it is the only measure of contract damages that 
induces breach only where breach is more efficient than is 
performance. 
Consider again the contract between A and B for delivery of a 
house at a price of $100,000, a house that B values at $115,000. If it 
can be easily determined that B's position under the completed con-
tract will be a net gain of $15,000, then the expectation loss that B 
suffers from A's nonperformance is precisely $15,000. If A is aware 
that that measure is the one that will be used if he breaches, then A 
will breach only when it is economically efficient to breach. Since A 
will be responsible to B for $15,000, he will breach only when Coffers 
him more than $115,000 for his house. If C does make such an offer, 
then it may be concluded that the house is worth at least that much to 
C and that, therefore, he places a higher value on the house than does 
anyone else involved. Since our presumed goal for contract remedies 
is to move the house to its highest-valued use at the lowest cost, expec-
tation damages seem to be the routine remedy for which we have been 
looking. Still, the law found it difficult until recently to justify expec-
tancy as the routine contract remedy. 62 
While the theoretical attractiveness of expectation loss as a damage 
measure is straightforward, practical application of the measure is not. 
60. REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 347 comment a (1979). 
61. 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Ex. 1848). 
62. Despite the fact that expectation damages was the routine remedy, the law did not offer 
persuasive reasons for it until very recently. See the articles by Birmingham, supra note 2. 
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The crucial problem is to determine, after the breach has occurred, 
what the innocent party's expected profit was at the time that the con-
tract was formed. Clearly, the promisee has a powerful urge, after a 
breach, to exaggerate the gain he had expected from performance 
while the promisor has equally strong feelings that the gain could 
never have been so large. Recall that this is precisely the problem 
noted above with reliance damages. 63 
With regard to buyer's breach, the expectancy is lost profits. 
There are difficult measurement problems here, even though only rea-
sonably foreseeable profits are recoverable. Not the least of these 
problems is that of determining whether the buyer's breach has, as 
with a unique good, or has not, as with a pur~ly homogeneous good, 
resulted in the seller's having a lower quantity of sales. 64 
When one turns to consider measuring expectancy in the case of 
seller's breach, the problems are even more formidable. 65 The buyer is 
entitled to have his consumer's surplus protected by the law of reme-
dies if we are to have only efficient seller's breach. 66 While this much 
is easy to agree upon, it is difficult to reach a consensus on how best to 
measure the buyer's subjective value of performance. In most cases, 
the best that the court can do is to guess at the relative magnitude of 
that surplus vis-a'-vis the costs to the seller of completing the con-
tract. 67 If it determines that the completion costs are too high relative 
to the subjective value to be protected, then the court will very likely 
use an objective standard, the diminution in the market value of the 
breachee's affected property, to determine his expectation interest.68 
There appear to be no distinguishing characteristics of cases in which 
cost of completion is superior to diminution in market value as the 
measure of the buyer's expectancy.69 
63. It should be clear that in this situation the usual formation or performance defenses are 
not at issue. Thus, the economic consideration of which party was the cheaper insurer against 
the unexpected contingency that has frustrated the performance of the contract is not relevant. 
64. See Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. 
REV. 323, 330-35, 346-48 (1979) (concluding that in a competitive market, lost-profit damages 
are inappropriate); see also Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 
S. CAL. L. REV. 283, 292-93 (1984). 
65. See generally Carroll, Four Games and the Expectancy Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 503 
(1981) (urging the increased availability of specific performance, in large part because expectancy 
damages are likely to be under-compensatory). 
66. In the house sale example above, B's surplus of $15,000 was adequately protected only by 
expectation damages. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text. 
67. The most notorious example of how wrong these guesses can be is Peevy house v. Garland 
Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla.), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963). For a discussion of 
this case see Linzer, supra note 11, at 134-38. 
68. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 272, 377 (1979). 
69. For a survey of recent cases see Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market 
Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 396-99 (1983). Professor 
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To alleviate these problems the common law has imposed some 
constraints on the expectancy of the innocent party:70 the profits must 
have been reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party;71 the profits 
must have been reasonably certain, 72 and the innocent party must 
have made good faith efforts to mitigate the damages. 73 Still, these 
guidelines do no more than make the measuring of expectation loss 
more tractable; by no means do these rules make it a simple matter. 74 
The common law's constraints on determining expectation loss 
from breach of contract may then be understood as an attempt to in-
duce an efficient exchange of information at the time of contract for-
mation on profits that will be foregone in the event of breach. Given 
that the parties are already in contact about so much of mutual inter-
est, the costs of exchanging information about expected profits should 
be relatively low. 75 This goal is consistent with the goal of economic 
efficiency as applied to breach of contract in that it places a large part 
of the burden of determining expectancy at contract formation time on 
those who can most cheaply assess it, the contractual parties, and re-
lieves the court of the burden of making this determination only after 
a breach. 
The recent literature on damages as a contract remedy has con-
firmed the superiority, from an efficiency standpoint, of expectation 
over other damage measures. Professor Shavell has recently shown, in 
an elegant model of the decision to perform or to breach, that, 
although no damage measure can act as a perfect substitute for a com-
plete contingent contract, 76 the expectation measure is generally 
Muris argues that no blanket rule is appropriate; rather, the courts must protect the buyer's 
subjective valuation by determining, apparently on a case-by-case basis, the cheaper form of ex-
pectation damages. Id. at 395-96. 
70. 22 AM. JuR. 2o Damages § 46 (1965). 
71. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 
F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), noted in 71 ILL. B.J. 506 (1983). 
72. Freund v. Washington Square Press, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 314 N.E.2d 419 (1974); Griffen 
v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (1858). 
73. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 350 (1979); U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-704, 2-706, 
2-711, 2-712 (1977); Farnsworth, supra note 48, at 1158. 
74. These guidelines, while making dispute resolution more efficient, also lessen the tendency 
to promote only efficient breaches because A is less likely to be forced to make B as well off as he 
had expected to be upon completion of the promise. 
75. There might be some reluctance, however, on the part of the parties to give expected 
profit information because it increases the other party's bargaining strength. If one party knows 
in advance that the other party will make a profit of $10,000 under one set of terms, he might 
negotiate for terms that give him more profit. 
76. A complete contingent contract would include provisions for dealing with every conceiv-
able future contingency. Certainly the costs of this sort of specification are prohibitive. It seems 
far more sensible to believe that contractual parties specify contingencies up to the point at which 
the cost of specifying what should be done in the event of one more contingency is equal to the 
expected benefit from allocating responsibility for loss in the event of that contingency. 
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Pareto-superior to any other in promoting only efficient breach.77 
These models ignore, however, the possibility of recontracting or 
renegotiating after formation and after the seller's announcement of 
his intention to breach. If the costs of renegotiation are not too high, 
some of the remedies considered may be more efficient than others at 
inducing the parties to use recontracting rather than some less efficient 
alternative, like litigation, to allocate the losses from breach. 
Professor Rogerson has considered the situation when renegoti-
ation is possible. 78 He compares the abilities of reliance damages, ex-
pectation damages, and specific performance, given the possibility of 
post-breach negotiations, to minimize deviations from an optimal level 
of reliance. An interesting additional consideration is whether differ-
ent negotiating abilities affect the outcome under different remedies. 
He concludes that at any level of relative negotiating strength, the 
inefficiency from reliance damages is greater than that from expecta-
tion damages79 and that specific performance "always generates at 
least as efficient an outcome as expectation damages. Furthermore, 
for all levels of negotiating strength, "specific performance Pareto-
dominates expectation damages and reliance damages."80 
The conclusion of the literature on the efficiency goal in damage 
measures for breach of contract may be briefly stated: the expectation 
interest is the only measure of damages that will lead to efficient 
breach. There are, nonetheless, some widely recognized problems that 
arise in the measurement of the breachee's expectation interest. In the 
case of buyer's breach, the seller's reasonably foreseeable profits from 
the completed contract should be taken as the measure of damages if 
the goal is to encourage only efficient breach. Yet there are well 
known pitfalls in computing lost profits. In the case of seller's breach, 
the buyer's expectation interest is his consumer surplus or subjective 
valuation of the completed contract. There are serious evidentiary 
problems in determining this amount. It is probably the case that stip-
ulated damages, if enforced even with a seemingly punitive element, 
are a less costly way to protect subjective valuation than are expecta-
77. Shavell, supra note 58, at 485. For an analysis of the efficiency of other aspects of con-
tracts, see Diamond & Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: 
Steady States. 10 BELL J. EcoN. 282 (1979) (impact on efficient damage measures of assuming a 
costly stochastic search process for contractual partners); Farber, Reassessing the Economic Effi-
ciency of Compensatory Damages/or Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443 (1980) (question-
ing the efficiency aspects of the strict compensation principle); Polinsky, supra note 31 (ability of 
contract remedy to allocate risk optimally). 
78. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, Working Pa-
per No. 8 (Apr. 1983), Law & Economics Workshop Series, Stanford University Law School. 
79. Id. at 5. 
80. Id. at 6. 
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tion damages. It is as yet an open question whether the inefficiencies 
of the alternative legal remedies, restitution and reliance, are severe 
enough to offset the far greater ease and precision of measuring those 
alternatives to expectation. We have yet to discuss whether expecta-
tion, with its high costs of measurement, is a superior guarantor of 
only efficient breach than is the equitable remedy, specific perfor-
mance. I turn to that discussion in the next section. 
IV. THE EFFICIENCY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Damage payments are the legal remedy for contract breach; spe-
cific performance is the equitable remedy. 81 Specific performance is a 
judicial order requiring the promisor to perform his contractual prom-
ise or forbidding him from performing the promise with any other 
party. 82 If, for example, A has promised to sell a house to B for 
$100,000 but breaches in order to sell to C for $125,000, B might seek 
relief in the form of a court order requiring A to sell to B. Alterna-
tively, B might ask the court for an injunction forbidding A to sell to 
anyone but B. As a general rule, the court invokes equitable remedies 
only when it thinks that legal remedies are likely to offer inadequate 
relief, that is, to be under-compensatory. 83 The granting of equitable 
relief is at the discretion of the court upon a demonstration by the 
plaintiff that damages will not adequately compensate him. The typi-
cal cases in which this under-compensation is said to arise are in the 
sale of "unique goods,"84 the sale of land (considered by the law, 
largely for historical reasons, to be a unique good), 85 and long-term 
81. J. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, CoNTRACTS 132-37 (3d ed. 1977). 
82. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (5th ed. 1979). 
83. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 359(1), comment a (1979); see also u.c.c. 
§ 2-716 (1977). An exhaustive list of contracts that courts are likely to enforce by specific per-
formance is given in SA A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 1143-1155 (1964). Among those identified 
are the following: contracts for the sale of standing timber; contracts for the sale of land or for 
the sale of other unique goods; contracts requiring performance in installments, for example, 
alimony and an insurance company's promise to pay benefits in installments; contracts for the 
sale of corporate shares, if the shares cannot be obtained in the market and the plaintiff's dam-
ages cannot be ascertained; contracts to lend money, but only if the promisee has materially 
changed his position since formation, made new contracts, and already transferred all his land to 
give security; contracts for the benefit of a third person; and contracts by a trustee, owing to the 
historical fact that trusts were created by courts of equity and long remained out of the reach of 
courts of common law. Corbin also enumerates the types of contracts in which courts will gener-
ally refuse to grant specific performance, even if remedies at law are inadequate. Id. §§ 1162-
1176. These include cases of contract frustration due to impossibility, fraud, unilateral mistake, 
and the like. 
84. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1) (1977) ("[s]pecific performance may be decreed where the goods are 
unique or in other proper circumstances"). 
85. A. CASNER & w. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 725 (3d ed. 1984); Farns· 
worth, supra note 48, at 1154. But cf UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS Ac::r § 2-506(b), 13 U.L.A. 
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input contracts. 86 When an otherwise innocent party asks for specific 
performance, the breacher is permitted to mount defenses that are not 
usually available against a damage award: insufficient certainty of 
terms, inadequate security for the innocent party's performance, the 
breacher's unilateral mistake, and the high level of supervisory costs 
that the court might incur in enforcing performance. 87 
The economic efficiency of this state of affairs is open to question. 
In particular, it is not obvious that the efficient exchange of reciprocal 
promises or the enforcement of valid contractual promises is best 
served where specific performance is reserved for the circumstances 
noted above. Indeed, we have already seen that some scholars have 
suggested that specific performance is generally more efficient than 
other contract remedies. 88 In this SS!ction, I shall attempt to show that 
specific performance should be, on efficiency ground~, the routine con-
tract remedy.89 The reasons for this conclusion may be briefly sum-
marized here. First, if contractual parties are on notice that valid 
promises will be specifically enforced, they will more efficiently ex-
change reciprocal promises at formation time. In particular, they will 
have a stronger incentive than currently exists under the dominant 
legal remedy to allocate efficiently the risks of loss from breach rather 
than leaving that task, in whole or in part, to the court or to post-
breach negotiations conducted under the threat of a potentially ineffi-
cient legal remedy. Second, and perhaps most importantly, specific 
performance offers the most efficient mechanism for protecting subjec-
tive values attached to performance. Thus, it promotes contract 
breach only if it is efficient, that is, if someone will be better off and no 
one will be worse off because of the breach. In this regard, specific 
performance and an expansive enforcement of stipulated remedies 
constitute integral and inseparable parts of a unified theory of efficient 
contract remedies. Third, if specific performance were the routine 
remedy, the post-breach costs of adjusting a contract in order to move 
633-64 (1977) (rejecting the notion that a seller of real property is automatically entitled to spe-
cific performance). 
86. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 16 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 369, 390-92 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-716, comment 2 (1977). 
87. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 362 comment a, 363, 364, 366 (1979). Thus 
while legal remedies for breach of contracts for labor and other professional services would typi-
cally result in under-compensation, courts will generally refuse to grant specific performance as a 
remedy. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 367(1) (1979) states that specific perform-
ance of a promise of a personal, i.e., a nondelegable, service will not be decreed. See also id. 
§ 361 illustrations 1 & 2, regarding duties to forbear, specifically not to compete. 
88. See text at notes 78-80 supra. 
89. Schwartz, supra note 6, reached the same conclusion for reasons related to, but distin-
guishable, from mine. 
366 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:341 
the promise to the highest-valuing user would be lower than under the 
most efficient legal remedy. The central reason for this is that under 
specific performance the costs of determining various parties' valua-
tion of performance are borne by those parties in voluntary negotia-
tions. This means that the costs of determining willingness-to-pay are 
borne by those most efficiently placed to determine that amount. Fi-
nally, because the costs of ascertaining any subjective values of the 
innocent party through evidence presented to a court are so high and 
because, therefore, the possibility of undercompensating the innocent 
party through a damage remedy is high, specific performance is far 
less likely to be undercompensatory and far more likely to protect the 
breachee's subjective valuation than is any other judicially imposed 
contract remedy. 
A. The Role of Transaction Costs in Determining Contract 
Remedies 
To begin the development of an integrated theory of legal and eq-
uitable remedies for breach of contract, it is appropriate to review a 
proposed approach to choice of remedies in a different area of the law. 
Professors Calabresi and Melamed have offered an integrated theory 
of remedies designed to promote efficient resource use in resolving in-
compatible property uses, that is, in circumstances where there are 
externalities.90 Assume that society has already allocated the rights, 
which Calabresi and Melamed call entitlements, to various scarce re-
sources, and further assume that the assignment has been conducted 
so as to lead to the most efficient use of society's scarce resources. 
This having been done, society must next determine what institutions, 
including rules of law, will most efficiently protect those entitlements. 
Calabresi and Melamed suggest that, where feasible, the constraints 
imposed by voluntary exchange offer the best method of both protect-
ing entitlements and of directing them to their highest valued use. The 
court may assign an entitlement and then, through the granting of in-
junctive relief, instruct the parties in conflict to use the method of vol-
untary exchange to protect that assignment.91 An injunction, in this 
90. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Later articles commenting on various aspects of 
this seminal article are Frech, The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The 
Nonequivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights, 17 EcoN. INQUIRY 254 (1979); Polinsky, 
Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Rights Liability Rules and Tax-
Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); and Polinsky, On the Choice Between Property 
Rules and Liability Rules, 18 EcoN. INQUIRY 233 (1980). 
91. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1105-10. The injunction in this model should be 
understood to cover both a negative injunction forbidding the defendant from doing something 
and a mandatory injunction requiring him to do something affirmatively. How a conditional 
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framework, is to be understood as a declaration that the prices arrived 
at by bargaining in voluntary exchange are the best guide to determin-
ing which of the conflicting uses is more efficient.92 This method of 
protecting entitlements - a method that the authors call one of prop-
erty rules - is the most efficient means when the level of transaction 
costs between the parties in conflict is low. Only in those circum-
stances is it possible for voluntary exchange to determine which of the 
competing uses is of higher value. 
The market cannot make this determination, however, when the 
transaction costs between parties in dispute are high.93 When volun-
tary exchange is incapable of resolving disputes about which of two 
conflicting uses of entitlements is more valuable, Calabresi and Me-
lamed propose using judicially supervised exchange to protect and, 
possibly, reallocate resources.94 This is the method of assessing money 
damages. Leaving aside the very complicated problems of how to de-
termine the level of damages, we may understand, following Calabresi 
and Melamed, legal relief as being a determination by the court of an 
objective price at which the entitlement in dispute would have 
changed hands had transaction costs been very low. This hypothetical 
market analysis - a method that Calabresi and Melamed call protec-
tion of an entitlement by a liability rule - is the most efficient way of 
determining the most valuable use of an entitlement over which there 
is a conflict if the transaction costs between the parties are high.95 
Let us briefly consider an example. Suppose that a factory begins 
to create a great deal of air pollution, causing harm to the property 
and health of the many residents who live nearby. Let us use the Cala-
bresi and Melamed framework to analyze what method most effi-
ciently protects the rights assignment, whatever that assignment may 
be. Suppose that the residents have an entitleID;ent to be free from 
injunction might fit into the Calabresi and Melamed framework is not entirely clear. See Rabin, 
Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions. 63 VA. L. R.Ev. 1299, 1300-01 (1977). 
The Calabresi and Melamed property rule should also be interpreted to cover the case in which 
the court summarily dismisses the complaint; in those circumstances, the court may be said to 
have given the entitlement to the defendant and to have protected that assignment through a 
property rule in that, thereafter, the plaintiff's only means of gaining access to the entitlement is 
to purchase it from the defendant. 
92. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 48-52. 
93. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 90, at 1101. See text at notes 130-33 infra for a discus-
sion of the situations in which transaction costs are likely to be high. 
94. Id. at 1125. 
95. Id. at 1119-24. They also suggest that there may be circumstances in which society most 
efficiently protects entitlements by forbidding their exchange in either the market or through 
objective determination of value by a court. Although the issue of when a rule of inalienability is 
most likely to be the most efficient rule is important and interesting, it plays no role in the 
analysis of contractual remedies and will, therefore, not be discussed here. Id. at 1111-15. 
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harm from the factory's pollution. When they bring an action seeking 
relief from the harm, should the court protect their entitlement by 
granting injunctive relief against the factory or should the court assess 
money damages against the factory? The correct answer is probably 
that the entitlement is most efficiently protected by assessing money 
damages against the polluter. This is because the large number of par-
ties involved is likely to make the transaction costs between the resi-
dents and the factory so high as to make any voluntary exchange of 
the entitlement impossible. Thus, an injunction against the factory 
might create inefficiencies. 
If the factory valued the right to pollute more than the residents 
collectively valued the right to be free from pollution but if transaction 
costs between the two groups were high, it would prove impossible for 
the factory to purchase the right not to enforce the injunction away 
from the residents in whose favor it ran. Consider the costs to the 
factory of locating all those adversely affected by its pollution; of bar-
gaining with each of them about the price he is willing to accept to 
waive his right to be free from the pollution; and the costs to the fac-
tory and the residents of monitoring and enforcing the multi-party 
bargains. All of those costs are likely to be so high as to frustrate any 
voluntary exchange between the parties to the dispute. In addition, 
there is the special problem in this hypothetical situation of one of the 
residents holding out at the end: that is, waiting until his consent is 
the last one required for the bargain to be struck and then refusing to 
sell his right except for a monopoly price. Since the hold-out position 
is so valuable, there is every reason to believe that many residents will 
attempt to be the hold-out by balking at reaching any voluntary agree-
ment with the factory. The holdout problem further increases the 
costs of reallocating the entitlement to its highest valued use.96 In 
these circumstances, society should attempt through the court to take 
evidence on who values the entitlement more and then, through the 
court's determination of money damages, offer a collective valuation 
of the entitlement. That valuation would be the price at which society 
would allow the entitlement to change hands.97 
96. On the hold-out problem and the closely associated free rider problem, see H. KOHLER, 
supra note 3, at 559-60. The free-rider problem would have arisen in the situation described 
above if the court had chosen to protect that right by a property rule. Then, if the residents 
valued the right to be free from pollution more than the factory valued its right to pollute, the 
costs to the residents of purchasing that right from the factory would have been significantly 
raised by many residents' desire to let others bear all the costs of negotiating and concluding an 
exchange with the factory in the hope that they could then enjoy the benefits of a reduction in 
pollution without having to incur the costs of affecting the exchange. These residents would have 
taken a free ride on the efforts of their neighbors to purchase the right. 
97. Of course, this does not mean that the level of money damages must be set in such a way 
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The Calabresi-Melamed framework has a ready application to the 
question of efficient remedies for breach of contract. Damages and spe-
cific performance, like damages and injunctive relief in nuisance law, 
should be seen as alternative means of' achieving efficient resource allo-
cation in the face of different transaction costs. When a contract has 
been breached, the question of utmost importance to the court should 
be the level of transaction costs facing the defaulter and innocent 
party. If those costs are low, then private negotiations are possible 
and the most efficient relief for the court to order is specific perfor-
'mance. If, however, transaction costs are high, then the court should 
compel an exchange at a collectively determined value; that is, it 
should assess money damages against the breacher. 
In general, the post-breach transaction costs between contractual 
parties should not be high. After all, they have established a relation-
ship before the breach and the things that make for high transaction 
costs in other legal contexts are entirely absent here: the parties have 
identified each other; they have bargained to provide for many contin-
gencies - including, possibly, breach; they may have had contact af-
ter formation and before full performance to clarify details, report 
progress, and the like. Thus, if the parties did not provide for some 
form of relief in the event of breach, the costs to them of dealing with 
the contingency that has arisen to frustrate the contract should be low. 
This is a strong prima facie reason for making specific performance, 
rather than damages, the routine contract remedy. 
Certainly, the costs to the parties of resolving their dispute, for 
example, of determining what the innocent party's expectation interest 
is, would seem to be lower than they would be for a court. This is 
because the court, in order to resolve the dispute efficiently and to 
create an efficient rule to guide future contracting parties, would have 
to inform itself about all the relevant terms of the contract, the market 
for the commodity involved, the believability of each party's evidence 
on its expectancy, the reasonableness of the risks assumed, and so on. 
This is a burdensome and expensive duty for the court to take on. If 
instead the courts routinely award specific performance, future parties 
may be induced to stipulate their own remedies if it is efficient for 
as to allow the factory to purchase the right to pollute from the residents. The damages should 
be set in such a way that they approximate the price at which the residents would have willingly 
sold this right, if transaction costs had been low. If the level of damages has been correctly 
determined and is such that at that price it would not have been worth it to the factory to 
continue in operation, then the factory closes down and liquidates in order to discharge the 
residents' claims. This result is, by definition, the efficient result if the level of damages has been 
correctly determined. At any other price, the factory may pay the damages and continue in 
operation. 
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them to do so; otherwise, they will bargain in the understanding that 
specific performance will be enforced in the event of breach. It follows 
that only efficient breach will then occur. 
To see what this means, let us reconsider the example with which 
we have already discussed the efficiency aspects of various legal reme-
dies. Recall that A has contracted to sell a house to B for $100,000. 
Before the promise is completed, Coffers A $125,000, and A breaches 
his contract with B in order to sell to C. Suppose now that when B 
sues A, the court awards B specific performance rather than damages. 
This does not mean that the house cannot end up with C: who is the 
person to whom wealth-maximizing or efficiency considerations urge 
us to direct the asset. Indeed, under specific performance the house 
can pass to C in several ways. A might purchase the right to specific 
performance from B and then sell to C. Or B might refuse to release 
A, take possession, and then sell to C. 
In both of these cases, the house eventually passes to C, who, by 
assumption, values it more than does either A or B. What distin-
guishes the cases is the distribution of the gain from that breach. 
Where the remedy is specific performance, private negotiations after 
the innocent party has been assigned the entitlement to performance 
are the mechanism for dividing the gain. The important fact is that 
under specific performance the house will pass to the party who values 
it the most, regardless of how negotiations between the breacher and 
the innocent party apportion the surplus from breaching and selling to 
C.98 From an efficiency standpoint the allocation of this increase in 
value between breacher and innocent party is of secondary interest. 
To summarize, the level of transaction costs should guide the court 
in fashioning efficient contract remedies. Where those costs are low, 
the court should award specific performance; where they are high, 
money damages. Since, in general, the transaction costs between con-
tractual parties are low once a contract is formed, the routine remedy 
for breach should be specific performance. This will place the burden 
of resolving the breach on the contractual parties, whose costs of doing 
so are lower than those of the court. The costs of dividing any surplus 
to be realized from efficiently breaching the contract will be borne by 
the breacher and the breachee, not by the court. This, too, is an effi-
cient result. Combined with the fact that only efficient breach will 
occur if specific performance is the routine remedy, specific perform-
ance is the only contract remedy that is efficient on both levels: en-
98. The only caveat to this statement has to do with the effects of strategic behavior in the 
post-breach negotiations. See text at notes 132-35 infra. 
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couraging only efficient breach and efficiently resolving any breach 
that occurs. 
B. The Effect of Specific Peiformcince on Formation (Pre-Breach) 
Negotiation Costs 
One of the claims I have made for specific performance is that it 
will induce parties to exchange promises more efficiently. There are 
two important issues here: first, is it possible that the law's current 
,restrictions on the availability of specific performance correspond to 
the choice between specific performance and money damages to which 
contractual parties would stipulate if they were perfectly free to do so, 
and second, would specific performance cause contracting parties to 
expend resources inefficiently at formation time?99 · If the answer to 
either question is yes, then there is reason to doubt the superior effi-
ciency of specific performance as the routine contract remedy. How-
ever, as we shall see, neither of these questions may be answered 
affirmatively. The conclusion I draw is that specific performance, es-
pecially when combined with the more liberal attitude urged above for 
interpreting liquidated damages, will, in general, lower contract forma-
tion costs. 
1. The Relationship of Current Specific Performance Rules to 
Stipulations in Voluntary Exchanges 
Let us begin by seeing whether it might not be the case that the 
law's current rules for awarding specific performance and money dam-
ages correspond to what freely contracting parties would choose to 
stipulate as their contractual r~lief in the event of breach. The impor-
tance of the inquiry is this: if current remedies correspond to what 
voluntary exchange would stipulate at formation time as the wealth-
maximizing remedies, then that constitutes strong evidence that the 
current law of contract remedies is efficient. 
In an important article Professor Kronman has suggested that, 
judged on an efficiency standard, specific performance is currently be-
ing correctly invoked.100 The heart of the argument is that, in a con-
tract for the sale of a unique good, promisor and promisee would 
agree, if the court would recognize their agreement, that the promisor 
should perform specifically. By the same token, in a contract for the 
sale of a fungible good, promisor and promisee would agree that 
99. Or, more accurately, would specific performance cause parties to expend resources more 
inefficiently than they would do with money damages as the routine remedy? 
100. Kronman, supra note 6, at 363·65. 
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money damages would be paid to the promisee in the event of the 
promiser's breach. Central to Professor Kronman's thesis that dam-
ages and specific performance are currently being efficiently applied as 
contract remedies is the cost to the court of determining the value of a 
substitute good: 
In asserting that the subject matter of a particular contract is unique 
and bas no established market value, a court is really saying that it can-
not obtain, at reasonable cost, enough information about substitutes to 
permit it to calculate an award of money damages without imposing an 
unacceptably high risk of undercompensation on the injured promisee. 
Conceived in this way, the uniqueness test seems economically sound. 101 
A crucial tenet of this argument is that money damages in the case of 
unique goods are likely to be under-compensatory and will, therefore, 
lead to inefficient breach. Thus, it is important to be clear about the 
sources of this under-compensation. 
The costs incurred in pre-contract search - those of locating sell-
ers, obtaining information, comparing quality, and so on - are not 
generally recoverable if the contract is breached. 102 In this respect 
what distinguishes fungible from unique goods is that, despite the 
breach, pre-contract search costs will bear fruit in the case of fungible 
goods but not in the case of unique goods. Therefore, money damages 
are likely to be under-compensatory in the case of unique goods. 103 
Professor Kronman asserts that there is a second sense in which 
the application of the two types of contract remedies conforms to the 
goal of efficiency. The uniqueness test 
draws the line between specific performance and money damages in the 
way that most contracting parties would draw it were they free to make 
their own rules concerning remedies for breach and bad they deliberated 
about the matter at the time of contracting. . . . [t]he uniqueness test 
promotes efficiency by reducing the costs of negotiating contracts.104 
The argument is that at the contract formation stage promisor and 
promisee would agree to judicially enforceable damages or specific 
performance remedies in precisely the circumstances in which courts 
currently apply those alternatives. Let us examine the two possibilties, 
unique and fungible goods, in tum. 
When the contract covers unique goods, the promisee will prefer 
the remedy of specific performance to damages, under which he is 
likely to be under-compensated in the event of breach. The promisor 
will always prefer damages to specific performance, regardless of 
101. Id. at 362. 
102. 5 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS § 1034 (1964) 
103. Krorunan, supra note 6, at 364. 
104. Id. at 365. 
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whether the good is unique. 105 The promisor must therefore be en-
ticed to opt for a clause in favor of his specific performance by the 
promisee's offer to pay a contract price that is greater than he would 
pay if he only wanted money damages. Professor Kronman argues 
that promisors of unique goods, facing a thin market, will be more 
willing to accept a provision for specific performance than would be 
the case with fungible goods because the chances of his receiving a 
more attractive third-party offer are not very high. 106 For nonunique 
goods and services, the promisor is more likely to receive alternative 
offers before he has fulfilled his contractual promise and is, therefore, 
more adamant about retaining the flexibility that comes with a money 
damages rule. In short, Kronman concludes that the circumstances in 
which courts now routinely apply money damages and specific per-
formance are the same circumstances in which efficiency dictates those 
remedies. Moreover, private negotiations between parties at the time 
of contract formation covering remedies in case of breach would also 
conform to the current judicial guidelines for legal versus equitable 
relief. 
There is a sense in which this conclusion is perfectly correct and 
yet not as forceful as it at first may seem, and there is another sense in 
which Professor Kronman's conclusion is incorrect. Before discussing 
what may be correct about this hypothesis, let me point out where it 
goes awry. First, the contention that equitable relief is reserved in the 
law only for contracts involving unique goods is not correct. Specific 
performance has been applied by the courts to numerous circum-
stances in which "uniqueness" of goods or services is not obvious. The 
most often cited unique contracts are those for the conveyance of land, 
and yet, economically speaking, there is nothing unique about parcels 
of realty. 107 In fact, in most circumstances substitutes abound. An-
other location at a slightly different price is just as good. It is a differ-
105. This is so because the promiser will only breach if he is better off by breaching, le., 
someone offers him more money. If he need only pay damages, he can keep all of the additional 
money himself unless the promisee can overcome problems of proof of expectation greater than 
contract costs. If, however, specific performance is the remedy, the seller must use that addi-
tional money to buy the buyer's right to specific performance. 
106. K.ronman, supra note 6, at 368-69. 
107. See 71 AM. JuR. 2D Specific Performance § 112 (1973): 
The subject matter most commonly involved in actions for specific performance is that of 
contracts for the sale of land or contracts which otherwise involve interests in real estate. 
The reason for this lies . • • in the fact that the remedy at law is less likely to be adequate in 
the case of land than in the case of other property • . . The most important aspect of land, 
insofar as equity jurisdiction for specific performance is concerned, is that no piece of land 
has its counterpart anywhere else, and is impossible of duplication by the expenditure of any 
amount of money. 
Footnote omitted. See also Dickinson v. McKenzie, 197 Ark. 746, 126 S.W.2d 95 (1939); 
McVoy v. Baumann, 93 N.J. Eq. 638, 117 A. 725 (1922). 
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ent thing altogether to assert that a particular individual considers a 
particular piece of land unique. In that case, the issue is not so much 
uniqueness as it is some contractual party's subjective valuation, the 
issue that, as we shall see, is at the heart of the issue of the most appro-
priate general contract remedy. Similarly, agreements by the seller of a 
business not to compete with the buyer are routinely enforced by spe-
cific performance.108 In various jurisdictions equitable relief for breach 
of contract has been ordered for such wide-ranging agreements as the 
following: the sale of a' franchised bottled-gas business, 109 a contract 
for the support of an illegitimate child, 110 and an advertisement.1 11 A 
survey of actions for specific performance of sales of corporate stock 
between 1953 and 1961 found that most of those contracts were specif-
ically enforced.112 Requirements contracts - those to buy and sell all 
of a given commodity that the buyer may need or require in his busi-
ness during a specified, usually long, period - are frequently specifi-
cally enforced where the plaintiff seeks that remedy. 113 Some states 
have statutorily liberalized the granting of relief through specific 
performance.114 
Finally, Professor Corbin has written: 
A reading of many modern cases will make clear the fact that the 
question of adequacy of other remedies is very frequently not even re-
ferred to in the opinion of the appellate court. They do not take the 
trouble to explain why such remedies are not adequate for complete jus-
tice, even though their inadequacy does not clearly appear from the re-
ported facts. . . . [T]he impression plainly left by the sum-total of 
reported cases is that the remedy of specific enforcement is as available 
as are other remedies, now that in almost all jurisdictions all remedies 
are to be sought in a single system of courts and no longer in separate 
and mutually suspicious courts of common law and courts of chancery. 
Objections on the ground of inadequacy of money damages are less often 
made than formerly and are given less consideration by the judges. Of 
108. See, e.g., Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331 (1955); Diamond Match Co. v. 
Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887); Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711). 
See generally Goldschmid, Anti-trust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal For Dealing With Restric-
tive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1973). 
109. Hogan v. Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
110. 10 AM. JuR. 2o Bastards § 73. 
111. Goddard v. American Queen, Inc., 44 A.D. 454, 61 N.Y.S. 133 (1899). 
112. Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Petformance, 40 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1961). 
113. See Farnsworth, supra note 48, at 1155; Speidel, supra note 86; Van Hecke, supra note 
112, at 7-8. 
114. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CooE art. 16, § 169 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § IA 
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1955). The change was recommended by the Massachusetts Judicinl 
Council, which apparently felt that in a heavily regulated economy, money damages were no 
longer equivalent to performance. For a discussion of these states' approaches, see Van Hecke, 
supra note 112, at 9-11. 
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course, a defendant who wishes a jury trial will be more insistent on the 
adequacy of the common law remedy. 115 
It is worth noting that in the civil law countries specific performance is 
the routine contract remedy. 116 This is a difficult situation to under-
stand if there is really something to Professor Kronman's contention 
that confining equitable relief to the case of unique goods corresponds 
to what freely contracting parties would prefer. Perhaps the tastes of 
contracting parties in Western Europe are vastly different from those 
in the common law countries, but this is very doubtful. More likely, 
there is no necessary connection between specific performance and 
uniqueness. 117 
While it would be too much to maintain that these observations 
represent an exhaustive sample of the instances in which specific per-
formance has been or will be granted, they strongly suggest that the 
instances in which the court will award equitable relief rather than 
damages is by no means limited to the instances of uniqueness ad-
duced by Professor Kronman.11s 
All this having been said, it is nonetheless the case that there is an 
important germ of truth in Professor Kronman's hypothesis. I believe 
that his contention would be completely accurate if it were revised to 
read as follows: If contracting parties were free to specify any remedy 
that was mutually agreeable, they would be likely to opt for specific 
performance rather than damages where the promisee attached some 
particular subjective valuation to the promisor's performance. The key 
difference here is the insertion that it is subjective valuation rather 
than uniqueness that makes specific performance attractive. Clearly, 
there is a relationship between uniqueness and subjective valuation: 
someone is more likely to attach a value greater than market value to a 
rare, one-of-a-kind item than to a highly fungible item. However, the 
class of things to which someone attaches a subjective valuation is 
115. 5A A. CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 1142, at 125-26 (1951). 
116. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE C!vIL LAW SYSTEM 1108-21 (2d ed. 1977); 
Dawson, Specific Performance in French and German Law, 57 MICH. L. REV. 495, 524 (France), 
529-30 (Germany) (1959). Specific performance is also the routine remedy in most Communist 
countries, probably because markets in which the breachee may make a covering transaction are 
not readily available. See Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist 
Economy, 72 YALE L.J. 1326, 1330-31 (1963) 
117. Alternatively, it may be argued that specific performance is not, in practice, the routine 
contract remedy in civil law countries. Some scholars note a trend toward convergence in con-
tract remedies in the civil and common law countries. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, 
supra note 116, at 1122-23. There is, however, a dearth of empirical evidence on this point. 
118. The fact that we do not have empirical analyses of the percentage of contract disputes 
resolved through damages and through specific performance is a measure of how far we have to 
go in making positive analysis of the law. Nor do we know for certain how, if at all, those 
percentages have varied over time. With the computerization of case reporting, the cost of mak-
ing such analyses may have fallen far enough to make them feasible. 
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greater than the class of unique items. Once his category is expanded 
to include all promises to which there is a subjective valuation, then 
the rest of Professor Kronman's analysis stands. 
Of course, it is not now the case that contracting parties may spec-
ify any contractual remedy. As we have seen, 119 they may not stipu-
late damages in excess of reasonably anticipated expectation damages, 
nor may they agree to be specifically bound.120 Absent these restric-
tions, contracting parties would stipulate remedies that, at the most 
reasonable cost, adequately protected the value they anticipated from 
completion of the contract. If the least expensive manner of doing 
that is for the promisor to agree to be specifically bound, then presum-
ably that is what will be stipulated in the contract. It is possible, how-
ever, to imagine a circumstance in which the parties would agree to a 
stipulated money damages remedy, in excess of actual damages, as the 
least cost method of protecting a subjective value. This might occur 
where there is reason to believe that the most likely frustrating contin-
gency would make performance physically impossible, a circumstance 
for which specific performance would provide no salve at all. 121 In the 
case of fully fungible goods, contracting parties would no doubt be 
willing to leave their stipulations as to remedies at expectation 
damages. 
2. Contract Formation Costs with Specific Performance Available as 
a Stipulated Remedy and as the Routine Court-Imposed 
Remedy 
Almost no attention has been paid to the effect that specific per-
formance as the routine remedy would have on contract formation 
costs. There are three possibilities: formation costs can rise, be unaf-
fected, or fall, as compared to formation costs under money damages 
as the routine remedy. For those performances to which the promisee 
attaches a subjective valuation the formation costs under specific per-
formance would probably· decrease. This is because the wider availa-
bility of the equitable remedy would relieve the parties of tJ:.ie costs of 
contracting around the law's unwillingness to enforce either a puni-
tive-seeming liquidated damage clause or an agreement to perform 
119. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See text at note 45 supra. 
121. It is an interesting question whether the unavailability of stipulated damages in excess of 
actual damages and of stipulated specific performance have made the costs of exchanging 
promises to which one party attaches a subjective valuation inefficiently high. Because there is 
still some gain to be had from exchanging these promises, parties may have been forced to con-
tract around the law's reluctance to allow them to protect their subjective valuation at contract 
formation time. 
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specifically. A party who wants his subjective valuation protected 
must currently find alternative methods of insuring against that frus-
tration. He must, for example, find someone other than the other con-
tracting party to underwrite his subjective value on performance. This 
happens even in circumstances, as we have seen, in which the prom-
isor is probably the cheapest provider of that insurance.122 The prom-
isee might offer to pay the promisor a performance bonus, but its 
specification is costly and the enforceability of that provision is itself in 
some doubt. 
It might be argued that even if the contract formation costs of 
those seeking to protect subjective valuation would be reduced by the 
routine availability of specific performance, the costs for those con-
tracting for the sale of fungible goods would be raised. This would be 
the case if the parties had to undertake some formation expenses not 
currently incurred in order to avoid specific performance. The worst 
that can be envisioned is that the sale of a purely homogeneous prod-
uct would become more expensive because the parties would be 
obliged to include a stipulation as to damages. 
While it is perhaps true that making specific performance the rou-
tine contract remedy would increase the cost of contracting for the 
sale of fungible goods, there is a sound economic reason for not being 
much concerned about this increase: the increase is not likely to be 
large. There can be little doubt that for pure homogeneous goods boil-
erplate stipulations would become even more routine than they cur-
rently are, and if the courts continue to enforce stipulated remedies 
that do not exceed reasonably anticipated damages, then there would 
be no question about the enforceability of these stipulations. Even 
when the homogeneity of the contractual good is not pure, that is, 
when there is some product differentiation, the costs to the parties of 
contracting around specific performance, if that is what they prefer to 
do, are not likely to be large. As one passes along the spectrum from 
purely homogeneous to more unique goods, the costs of contracting 
out of specific performance as the routine remedy increase. Note, 
however, that as the uniqueness of the contractual performance in-
creases, it becomes increasingly likely that the promisee will be willing 
to let the routine remedy of specific performance protect his expecta-
tion interests. Thus, the cost increase is likely to affect a small subset 
of those forming contracts, and, even for that limited class, boilerplate 
stipulations are likely to make the cost increases trivial. 
This may seem a curious argument: above it was asserted that one 
122. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
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of the inefficiencies of not allowing specific performance as the routine 
remedy was that it forced those parties who wished to protect their 
subjective valuation to expend resources inefficiently in contracting; 
here, it is being asserted that if additional formation costs are inflicted 
on those who wish to contract around specific performance, that is 
efficient. Why is this increase in costs excusable in the one case as 
efficient and inexcusable in the other as inefficient? The only answer, 
absent empirical confirmation, is that the increase in contract forma-
tion costs to those who desire not to be specifically bound to their 
contractual promise are less than those currently inflicted on those 
who desire, but are unable to get, specific performance. 
Another group whose costs of contracting may be increased by the 
routinization of specific performance are those who would prefer stip-
u1ated money damages sufficient to protect their subjective valuation. 
It is hard, however, to see how they would be worse off under specific 
performance than under the regime of money damages. Let us assume 
for the moment that courts continue not to enforce liquidated reme-
dies that contain a seeming in terrorem clause. The best that this 
group can do under current contract remedies is to contract around 
these restrictions or, if a breach occurs, to persuade the court of the 
inadequacy of money damages. Both of those alternatives are expen-
sive. If specific performance becomes widely available, the costs to 
this group of protecting their subjective valuations will be reduced, but 
not minimized.123 So, although the routinization of specific perfor-
mance is not the best of all possible worlds for all of those with a 
subjective valuation to protect, it is better than a system in which 
money damages are the routine remedy. 
In summary, we may predict that contract formation costs would 
not on the whole be significantly changed by making specific perfor-
mance the routine contract remedy. For those who place a subjective 
valuation on performance, specific performance would reduce forma-
tion costs by relieving them of the high costs of contracting around the 
inadequacy of money damages or of demonstrating at trial the inade-
quacy of money damages. For those who, in the most efficient of all 
possible worlds, would prefer to protect their subjective value not 
through specific performance but rather through stipulated damages, 
the routinization of the equitable remedy would be superior to the cur-
rent regime but not as desirable as one in which any stipulation is 
av.ailable. The only group whose costs of contracting are likely to in-
crease under specific performance are those transacting in homogene-
123. Those costs will be minimized only if the option of stipulating damages up to the 
amount of their subjective valuation is made routinely available. 
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ous goods. They would be obliged to_ stipulate money damages in 
order to avoid being specifically bound in the event of breach. This 
increase, however, is not likely to be large because boilerplate stipula-
tions should become widely and inexpensively available. 
C. Post-Breach Costs and Specific Performance 
The literature on the efficiency of specific performance has concen-
trated on its post-breach negotiation costs. The consensus seems to be 
that these costs will be higher than those under money damages. 
There are sound reasons for questioning this conclusion. First, even if 
post-breach negotiating costs are higher under specific performance, 
they may be more productive at guaranteeing only efficient breach of 
contract. Second, post-breach costs may be high only during a transi-
tion period during which contractual parties adjust from damages as 
the principal contract remedy to specific performance as the routine 
remedy. As noted in the previous section, if the equitable remedy be-
comes widespread, the process of contract formation will become 
more efficient, leading, ceteris paribus, to fewer contract disputes. 
Third, court costs under specific performance will be less than under 
money damages. This is because there will be fewer contract disputes 
and, because the costs to promisees of protecting their subjective valu-
ation of performance will be reduced, they will not have to make elab-
orate and expensive showings to the court of the inadequacy of money 
damages. 
Let us take these costs up in turn. 
1. Transaction Costs, Again 
Recall the Calabresi-Melamed framework, which suggested that 
the most efficient remedy for a court to impose in a dispute was to be 
determined by examining the transaction costs facing the disputants. 
The presumption is that, when transaction costs are low, the market is 
superior to court proceedings as a method of determining relative val-
uation. If, however, transaction costs are high, then a market ex-
change could not resolve the dispute, and the court should perform a 
hypothetical market analysis by setting a level of money damages to 
approximate the price at which the plaintiff would have sold his enti-
tlement to the defendant if transaction costs had not been too high to 
frustrate such an exchange.124 I argued above that the application of 
this theory to contract remedies urged specific performance as the rou-
tine remedy on the grounds that, in general, the transaction costs_ be-
124. See notes 90-97 supra and accompanying text. 
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tween contractual parties were not high.125 We must now examine 
this contention in more depth. 
The principal reason for presuming low transaction costs as the 
general condition among contracting parties is that, by the time a 
breach appears, the parties have already done a substantial amount of 
negotiating. Relatively speaking, the costs to them of negotiating a 
mutually satisfactory (and efficient) conclusion to the breach are low. 
There is a powerful point to be made in rebuttal to this presump-
tion of low transaction costs: If the costs of resolving the dispute vol-
untarily are low, why are the parties in court? Should the presumption 
not be that, when contractual partners come to a court for resolution 
of a dispute, their transaction costs must be high; otherwise, they 
would have negotiated a settlement? 
Despite its plausibility, this point is incorrect. First, parties whose 
transaction costs are low may be induced to go to trial rather than 
settle if there is some uncertainty about what the law is or what it will 
do in a given fact situation. 126 Suppose, for example, that the innocent 
party to a breach believes strongly that money damages will un-
dercompensate him because he places a high subjective valuation on 
performance. He is certain that the breacher will not believe or sup-
port this claim in a settlement, but he has hopes that the court will be 
persuaded of the inadequacy of money damages and will award spe-
cific performance. If the defendant-breacher believes that the claim 
for inadequacy of money damages is not likely to be persuasive to the 
court, he then considers it likely that he will do better at trial than 
from settling. 127 Under those circumstances, not unlikely under cur-
rent contract law, the parties will go to trial, despite the low transac-
tion costs between the parties.12s 
Second, parties might prefer trial to further negotiation if they 
have come to the stage in their relationship in which passions have run 
so high that they can no longer profitably talk to one another either 
125. I also noted that there was more to the argument than the mere level of transaction 
costs. It might be, for example, that even though the transaction costs are not very low, the costs 
to a court of determining the expectancy of the promisee are so high that it would be cheaper to 
leave that determination to negotiations between the parties affected by involving specific per· 
formance. See text at notes 136-40 infra. 
126. See Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 150-56. Priest & Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,14-16 (1984), argue that the further each party's 
estimate of its fault is from the true standard the less likely is litigation. 
127. In order to make the point, the example has ignored the complications introduced from 
assuming that litigation is expensive. 
128. Note that if specific performance were the routine remedy, the parties in this hypotheti· 
cal would not do better at trial than they would in settlement. See text at notes 122-23 supra. 
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directly or through their representatives, say, their lawyers. 129 The 
argument would be that, when the possibility of negotiations has dis-
appeared, the transaction costs between the parties have become so 
high that equitable relief can no longer be relied upon to lead to an 
efficient solution, and so courts should then award money damages. 
There can be no doubt that this sort of thing happens, but it is not at 
all clear that an efficiency-based legal rule should take this to be an 
instance of the sort of high transaction costs that invoke a damages 
remedy. The reason for this has to do with the difference between 
objective and subjective transaction costs. 
Calabresi and Melamed did not distinguish between objective and 
subjective transaction costs, but for their theory to be a reliable guide 
to legal efficiency the distinction is crucial. By objective transaction 
costs I mean the transaction costs that reasonable people in an objec-
tively similar situation would face. The principal determinants of the 
level of objective transaction costs are the number of parties involved 
in the potential transaction, the complexity of the exchange envi-
sioned, and the costs of enforcing that exchange.130 Determining the 
level of these costs in any given situation is not an exact science. None-
theless, the conditions under which transaction costs are likely to be 
high are sufficiently well known that they can be predicted in most 
instances. Moreover, the concept of objective transaction costs should 
not arouse much controversy in the law because of its close resem-
blance to the law's widely-used "reasonable person" standard, itself a 
measure of objectivity. The more important point here is that the sub~ 
jective transaction costs of the particular litigants before the court are 
not, in general, relevant to the court's goal of fashioning an efficient 
rule of contract law. This means that whether the particular breacher 
and breachee before the court are still on speaking terms should not 
guide a court in choosing its remedy. 131 
Even if it is granted that transaction costs between contractual par-
ties are not, in general, high, a second objection has been raised to 
reliance upon voluntary post-breach negotiations to resolve the breach 
efficiently. Whenever an outcome of a bargain or game is uncertain 
and subject to negotiation, the parties to the game have an incentive to 
engage in strategic behavior - to posture, bluff, and in other ways 
129. See G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETILEMENT 48-52 (1983). 
130. Although no one has called these "objective" transaction costs, these are the most com-
mon elements of the usual list of those costs. See H. KOHLER, supra note 3, at 32-33. 
131. This is not to say that there are never any subjective conditions or attributes of the 
disputants that should be counted as transaction costs in applying the rule proposed by Calabresi 
and Melamed. 
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attempt to secure for themselves as large a share of the bargain as 
possible. Since it is very difficult for either party to determine when 
the other is bluffing, it may be that an otherwise efficient exchange is 
frustrated by this strategic behavior. One party may misperceive the 
other's position and hold out for more than the other is prepared to 
pay. The worry is that at some point no further bargaining will take 
place and the entire exchange will be frustrated.132 
Clearly, strategic behavior is present in almost all negotiations, but 
it is not at all obvious that strategic behavior frequently or even very 
often prevents an asset from moving to its highest-valuing user. In-
deed, most casual observers of negotiations and bargaining would be 
inclined to call strategic behavior the essence of the market process; 
that is, it seems to be very difficult to distinguish strategic behavior 
from the very sort of haggling and bargaining that are among the most 
distinctive characteristics of voluntary exchange. Given this, it makes 
little analytical sense, and would seem to be extremely unhelpful, to 
claim that market behavior is efficient when there is not strategic be-
havior and inefficient when there is. 
Moreover, nearly all of the examples of efficiency-frustrating stra-
tegic behavior133 do not stand up to scrutiny. For that behavior to 
frustrate an otherwise wealth-maximizing exchange, one party must at 
some point simply abandon the field and refuse to negotiate further. 
Why is it to be assumed that this refusal is inefficient? Perhaps the 
party who has abandoned the negotiation has determined that he gets 
greater utility from doing so than from completing the exchange, in 
which case the lack of a completed exchange is not inefficient at all. 
Perhaps the refusal to deal is yet another bargaining ploy designed to 
induce the other party to reveal more information. In that case, there 
may well be an exchange at some future date when new information is 
brought forward or when one party reopens the negotiations. It would 
be premature to claim that the breaking off of negotiations in this ex-
ample has frustrated a wealth- or value-maximizing exchange. At 
what particular point one chooses to say that strategic behavior has 
132. See Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and 
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075, 1078 (1980). 
133. See Polinsky, supra note 132, at 1078; see also Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 17-18, 20-27 (1982), for additional examples. Some commentators, e.g., R. POSNER, 
supra note 1, at 45, consider strategic behavior to be most likely to arise in situations of bilateral 
monopoly. A bilateral monopoly arises when a single buyer and a single seller face one another. 
The price and output· that result are not determinate, as they are when there are competing 
sellers or competing buyers. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 244-
49 (1971). The economic literature stresses this indeterminacy of price and quantity in bilateral 
monopoly. Nowhere does that literature suggest that an exchange will not take place between the 
monopolists. 
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caused the collapse of negotiations is no more precise than is the 
designation of which kind of strategic behavior fosters exchange and 
which kind frustrates exchange. This makes the notion less than help-
ful in analyzing voluntary exchange. 
There is another sense in which the notion of strategic behavior is 
not germane to an efficiency analysis of contract law. Strategic behav-
ior is most frequently associated with negotiations over the division of 
the surplus from an exchange, not with whether an exchange should 
take place. In the example above of a contract for the sale of a house, 
the negotiations between A and B over which of them should realize 
the surplus from selling the house to C are likely to be attended by 
strategic behavior. As we saw, however, the distribution of this sur-
plus between A and B is not at issue in an efficiency analysis.134 The 
primary issue was how the house could be moved to the highest valued 
user, here C: at the least cost and in a fashion that will create an effi-
cient rule of law to guide future contracting parties. The equity issue 
of which party should be the principal beneficiary is secondary, and, as 
we shall see, the distribution of that surplus is not a function in which 
the courts have a comparative advantage over other institutions in so-
ciety. Thus, because strategic behavior is most likely to arise where 
there is a surplus to be distributed, the most that can be said against it 
is that it will frustrate redistribution of that surplus, not that it will 
frustrate an efficient exchange.13s 
2. Court Costs 
By court costs I mean all the costs of using litigation to resolve a 
contract dispute in which the innocent party is asking for specific per-
formance. The purpose of this examination is to compare those costs 
with the costs of determining the level of money damages that would 
make the innocent party just as well off as if the contract had been 
performed. Thus, the comparison is not between the court costs of 
legal and equitable remedies under the current regime in which money 
134. See text at note 98 supra. 
135. These same shortcomings in the interpretation of strategic behavior apply to the conten-
tion that injunctive remedies create an incentive for the party holding the injunction to extort the 
other party. See Polinsky, supra note 132, at 1077-78. At best, this extortion is really a distribu-
tional issue, not an efficiency issue. One might also contend that, in the contract breach setting, 
the defendant knew or should have known of the possibility of his being "held up" by the plaintiff 
if specific performance were granted upon breach. Having known of this possibility, the defen-
dant should, therefore, have discounted the loss upon breach by its probability of occurring. 
Since that calculation could have been made at reasonable cost, there would be no efficiency 
reason for the court's redistributing the surplus from breach: the defendant has been compen-
sated ex ante for assuming the risk that a better buyer will appear before the completion of the 
contract. 
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damages are presumed to be adequate unless the breachee makes a 
convincing showing of their inadequacy. Rather, the comparison is 
between two different systems: in one, money damages is the routine 
contract remedy; in the other, specific performance is the routine rem-
edy. I shall assume that in both systems the goal of the law is to pro-
tect the breachee's expectation interest in order to induce promisors to 
breach only when it is Pareto-efficient to breach. 
When money damages are the routine remedy for breach of con-
tract, the informational demands on a court in reaching the efficient 
level of damages are extremely large. It is agreed that the plaintifrs 
expectation interest must be protected in order to guarantee that the 
contractual performance will accrue to the party who values it the 
most. In the case of seller's breach, this means that the difference be-
tween the buyer's reservation price for the performance and the con-
tract price must be awarded to insure a Pareto-efficient breach. 
Absent contractual language specifying what that reservation price is, 
this is a formidable evidentiary task. As noted above, at trial the 
buyer has every incentive to exaggerate his reservation price. Thus, 
the court must evaluate the innocent buyer's evidence on the value to 
him of the performance. Where the performance involves a fungible 
good, it is true that there is not likely to be a subjective valuation of 
the good that is different from the contract or market price of the 
good. Nonetheless, the court concerning itself with efficiency and de-
termined to protect expectancy through the assessment of money dam-
ages must take pains to see that, even with the fungible good, there is 
not an expectation interest that will be frustrated by an award only of 
the contract price. Where the performance is not fungible, the eviden-
tiary problems multiply.136 
Whether the performance concerns a unique or a fungible good, 
the court costs associated with specific performance are likely to be 
less than those associated with assessing money damages. With spe-
cific performance the court's inquiry, with an exception noted below, 
ends with a determination that there has been a breach. Once that 
determination has been made, the parties to the contract resolve the 
matter of the breachee's expectancy through negotiations. With 
money damages, the court must determine whether there has been a 
breach and the amount of damages that will efficiently compensate the 
innocent promisee. In terms of court costs, the distinction between the 
136. It was a desire to avoid precisely these evidentiary problems by encouraging contracting 
parties to exchange information about subjective values on performance that was at the heart of 
the argument for the general enforcement of liquidated damages clauses, even those with a seem· 
ing punitive element. See notes 29-43 supra and accompanying text. 
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two forms of contractual remedy is much like that between negligence 
and strict liability in tort law. It has been argued that strict liability is 
the more efficient standard in that its administrative costs are so much 
less than those of the negligence standard.137 In strict liability the 
plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant caused him harm. He need not make a showing of the de-
fendant's lack of care. When the standard for judging the defendant's 
liability is negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
caused him harm and that, in doing so, the defendant was not living 
'up to a reasonable standard of care.138 It is this second burden on the 
plaintiff in negligence that increases his costs in the same way that 
court determination of expectancy increases the costs of money dam-
ages as the routine contract remedy. 
In summary, the court costs attending specific performance are 
likely to be less than those attending legal relief. Less must be demon-
strated by the injured promisee, and the costs of determining the 
promisee's expectancy are left to negotiations between the promisee 
and promisor rather than being determined through evidentiary pro-
ceedings. The only valid argument against specific performance as the 
routine remedy on the basis of court costs is that specific performance 
might involve high supervisory costs, making it less efficient than 
money damages. 139 But as we shall see more fully below, this criticism 
is overdrawn. It should and does form the basis for a special defense 
to an action of specific performance, 140 but it is most likely to arise in a 
relatively limited class of contracts, viz., personal service contracts. 
Even in that limited class, the inefficiencies attributable to specific per-
formance because of high supervisory costs will be shown to be 
exaggerated. 
3. Relative Cover Costs 
In the recent literature on the efficiency of various contract reme-
137. See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (1973). Judge 
Posner also notes that, because the costs to plaintiffs of bringing a claim under a strict liability 
standard are so much less than those under a negligence standard, strict liability may lead to 
more claims or to more being spent on each claim. The net result of a switch from negligence to 
strict liability might then be an increase in the total costs of trials. Id. at 209. 
138. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 289-296 (1965). 
139. REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379 co=ent d (1932): .. • 
The refusal of affirmative specific enforcement in these cases is based in part upon the diffi-
culty of enforcement and of passing judgment upon the quality of performance, and in part 
upon the undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes 
have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone. In some cases the decree would seem like 
the enforcement of involuntary servitude. 
140. See notes 188-95 infra and accompanying text. 
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dies, the matter of relative cover costs has received much attention. 141 
The issue has to do with whether the seller or the buyer, after a 
breach, has access to the market at lower cost and whether, therefore, 
damages or specific performance is the more efficient remedy. Con-
sider the case of seller's breach. Suppose that there is reason to believe 
that the buyer is better able to cover than is the seller. It might be, for 
example, that the buyer can buy from the seller's competitors more 
cheaply than can the seller, 142 or that the buyer is more aware of his 
idiosyncratic needs than is the seller.143 The total resources consumed 
in moving the good to its highest-valued use are then minimized by 
making the buyer responsible for covering since he is the party who 
can cover more cheaply. Under a rule of money damages it is indeed 
the buyer who would cover. It is argued that, if specific performance 
were the remedy, then the buyer - here assumed to be the cheaper 
coverer - would inefficiently leave to the seller the task of finding 
substitute performance.144 On the other hand, if it is less expensive to 
have the breaching seller perform than to have him pay damages to 
the buyer and to have the buyer cover, then specific performance may 
be the preferred remedy.145 Professor Schwartz has argued that no 
general presumption holds: buyers and sellers have similar cover costs 
so that this cannot be used as a device for deciding which remedy, 
damages or specific performance, is more efficient.146 
He considers four possible objections to this conclusion. First, it 
might be argued that if buyers have generally lower cover costs but the 
routine remedy is specific performance, this difference in cover costs 
could induce buyers to breach in order to use post-breach negotiations 
to redistribute the gains from breach to themselves. This objection 
makes the unwarranted assumption that the difference between seller's 
and buyer's cover costs is greater than the buyer's lawyer's fees and 
other court costs.141 
Second, it might be objected that specific performance will induce 
excessive post-breach negotiation costs in the extreme circumstances 
in which the seller cannot cover at all. This might be the case if the 
seller is a monopolist or if the contractual good is unique. In those 
141. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 287; see also Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for 
Breach of Contract, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1380-82 (1982). 
142. Yorio, supra note 141, at 1384. 
143. Id. at 13\!4-85. -
144. Id. at 1385. 
145. Id. 
146. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 287. 
147. Id. at 287-88. 
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cases, however, the buyer cannot cover either, so that there is no rea-
son to believe that post-breach negotiation costs will be higher under 
one remedy than under the other.148 
Third, specific performance may generate higher post-breach nego-
tiation costs when there are two buyers and the first buyer's intended 
use for the seller's good is fungible while the second buyer's is not. 149 
Consider a contract for the sale of farmland. The original buyer in-
tends to use the land to farm, but prior to delivery a second buyer 
appears with a unique plan for the land and an offer to pay more than 
'the original buyer. The seller refuses to perform in the hope of selling 
to the second buyer. The objection to specific performance in this cir-
cumstance is that, since the cover costs for the first buyer are low, he 
should be given money damages in order to minimize the post-breach 
costs of moving the land to the highest-valued use. Under specific per-
formance, the first buyer would likely engage in protracted negotia-
tions in order to capture some of the seller's profit from the sale to the 
second buyer.150 Presumably, the suggestion is that an exception be 
made to specific performance as the general rule in these circum-
stances. Yet the litigation costs of determining whether a given fact 
situation fits this exception are likely to be high - higher, in general, 
than the efficiency gains from suspending equitable relief.151 
Fourth, when there are changed circumstances, the transaction 
costs of resolving a breach through negotiations are higher under spe-
cific performance than under money damages. Consider rapid infla-
tion. Professor Schwartz gives the following example.152 A buyer has 
contracted for construction of a building at $10,000 from which he 
will realize a profit of $3,000 upon completion. The contractor antici-
pated that the construction would cost him $8,000, but because of un-
anticipated inflation his costs have risen to $15,000. The promisor 
would prefer to breach, all other things equal, and pay the buyer his 
expectancy of $3,000, rather than to incur the additional costs of 
$7,000. It is cheaper for him to breach than to perform, and because 
the buyer can be made just as well off as he would have been had the 
148. Id. at 288. 
149. The difference in the two buyers' uses is necessary in order for there to be a particularly 
large gain at stake from reselling to the second buyer. If the second buyer is planning the same 
sort of use as the nrst buyer, then the price he would be willing to pay the seller would not be 
significantly different from the original contract price. Thus, there would not be much surplus 
from moving the contractual good to its highest-valued use, and, as a result, there would not be 
much to be gained from protracted post-breach negotiations between tile first buyer and the 
seller. 
150. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 289-90. 
151. Id. at 290. 
152. Id. at 290-91. 
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contract been performed, breach and the payment of expectation dam-
ages would appear to be Pareto-efficient. However, if specific perform-
ance is the routine remedy, the promisee will threaten that remedy in 
order to force the contractor to pay him more than his expectancy. 
The promisor should be willing to pay up to slightly less than $7,000 
in order to be relieved of having to perform. The situation will not, 
however, be materially different under the damage remedy. Since the 
standard remedy for breach of a construction contract is the difference 
between the contract price and the new market price, 153 the promisee 
can still force negotiations because he retains the power to impose a 
$7,000 loss on the contractor, even under damages. This is because 
the new market price would be $17,000 - the $15,000 costs plus 
$2,000 profit - which is $7,000 greater than the contract price of 
$10,000. Thus, in changed circumstances there is no greater post-
breach efficiency loss under specific performance than there is under 
money damages. 
There are two further points, not raised by Professor Schwartz, to 
be made about relative cover costs and the efficient contract remedy. 
The first is that the contracting parties may well have taken into ac-
count in the contract price their relative advantages in access to the 
market in the event of breach. The party with the superior ability may 
well have used that fact to offer more attractive contract terms. If so, 
then the matter of who should bear liability for covering in the event 
of breach becomes a matter of determining the parties' implicit assign-
ment of the risk of a particular contingency. For example, if the seller 
is better placed to cover in the event of breach, then, all other things 
equal, he should be able to offer this superiority to the buyer in ex-
change for a higher contract price discounted by the probability of the 
breach. Suppose that the seller can access the market for $100 less 
than can the buyer. If both parties estimate that there is a 0.5 
probability of breach, then a risk-neutral buyer should be willing to 
pay $50 more for the seller's performance in exchange for assigning 
the risk of covering in the event of breach to the seller. The seller 
should be willing to accept $50 more for assuming this risk. If the 
parties have assigned the risk of breach in this manner, there should be 
evidence of that in the contract price and, perhaps, in the language of 
the contract. 
The second point is that it is an overstatement to call the post-
breach negotiation costs a deadweight efficiency loss in so far as they 
serve only to redistribute wealth. 154 In some of the circumstances de-
153. REsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1932). 
154. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 285. 
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scribed above, there may be such deadweight losses. It is vital to note, 
however, that these short-term efficiency losses may lead to a superior 
exchange of mutually beneficial promises in the future and so pay for 
themselves. Suppose that the court imposes specific performance in an 
instance in which the buyer has lower cover costs than the seller, who 
has breached. From the discussion above we know that this will lead 
to higher post-breach negotiation costs than if the court awarded 
money damages. Nonetheless, consider the effect of this award of spe-
cific performance on the behavior of future contracting parties. A fu-
ture seller aware of the fact that the buyer has lower cover costs will 
insist on taking this fact into consideration in framing the terms of the 
contract. He should, for example, be willing to offer a lower contract 
price, discounted by the probability of breach, in exchange for the 
buyer assuming the risk of covering in the event of breach. The buyer 
should be willing to assume this risk in exchange for a lower contract 
price. Both parties are better off knowing that this assignment of risk 
will save them losses associated with negotiating about the division of 
the gains from breach. Thus, specific performance will lead to more 
efficient contracting by encouraging a more efficient exchange of mu-
tually beneficial promises in the future. The short-term efficiency 
losses that occur are transitory and should not form the basis of a 
general argument in favor of money damages. That is, these losses 
should be balanced against the present discounted value of the result-
ing increases in the efficiency of exchanging promises in the future plus 
the present discounted value of the savings from reduced uncertainty 
about and from litigation over the terms of future exchanges. When 
this is done, it may well be shown that the most efficient way to en-
courage more efficient future contracting is to impose some dead-
weight losses on the immediate parties.155 
4. Mitigation 
A matter related to cover costs is mitigation. This concept has 
not much figured in the debate on the most efficient contract rem-
155. This point has wide application. A court concerned with establishing efficient rules of 
law may find itself imposing what appear to be inefficient, wasteful losses in an effort to influence 
future behavior to become more efficient. Perhaps the best example of this is the famous case of 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921). There a contractual clause 
called for the use of a particular brand of pipe in the construction of a house; the contractor 
substituted an alternative. In holding that the buyer owed the balance due on the contract, the 
court said that it would be wasteful to require the contractor to incur the extraordinarily high 
costs of tearing up the interior walls in order to put in the proper brand of pipe. While in this 
case there might have been inefficiencies.from enforcing the terms of the contract, there is no 
doubt that if the court had imposed them on the contractor, future contractors and others would 
have been more efficiently cautious about taking it upon themselves to make substitutions with-
out consulting the other party. 
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edy,156 but clearly it should. We should like to know the relative effi-
ciency of legal and equitable relief with regard to their ability to 
induce efficient mitigation after the breach. With money damages 
there is an obligation on the breachee to mitigate his losses, 157 and it is 
generally conceded that this is an efficient obligation.15s 
With specific performance there is no such obligation to mitigate, 
nor is it easy to see how such an obligation could be imposed under 
that contract remedy.159 This raises the concern that under specific 
performance as the routine remedy there would be avoidable ineffi-
ciencies in that the promisee would no longer have the duty to miti-
gate his losses from nonperformance. If this is true, it may constitute 
a strong argument for retaining money damages as the routine con-
tract remedy. In order to rebut this argument it is necessary to show 
that specific performance will not inefficiently induce promisees not to 
mitigate their losses. 
Let us begin by noting that the duty to mitigate should be inter-
preted to cover not merely the duty regarding the solitary, post-repu-
diation actions of the promisee but also the duty on both parties to 
make what Professors Goetz and Scott call a cooperative readjust-
ment.160 The previous discussion of post-breach negotiation costs has 
already touched on mitigation in this second, cooperative sense.161 
Here I will draw special attention to the relationship between the al-
ternative contract remedies and the post-repudiation actions of the 
promisee. I shall discuss two different cases of buyer's breach: the 
first involving a perishable commodity; the second, an imperishable 
commodity. Both commodities will be assumed to be fungible. I shall 
not discuss cases of seller's breach, nor of the difference between 
unique and nonunique goods. The analysis of those situations follows 
that developed here for the cases of buyer's breach. 
Consider a contract for the sale of a perishable product like toma-
156. The exception is Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation. 69 VA. L. REv. 967 (1983). 
157. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs, § 350(1) comments b & c, illus. 1-5, 7 
(1979); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-708(1). 2-713(1), 2-715(2)(a) (1977). 
158. Goetz & Scott, supra note 156, at 973. 
159. One possibility is a conditional specific performance decree. The breachee would be 
awarded equitable relief on the condition that he had taken steps to mitigate his losses. See 
Rabin, supra note 91. It is possible that a court would interpret the restriction that those seeking 
equitable relief have "clean hands" as implying that they had taken steps to mitigate their losses. 
In any event, the argument developed below suggests that there is no need to make the award 
conditional, either explicitly or implicitly, since the breachee has precisely the same incentive to 
mitigate under unconditional specific performance as he has under money damages. 
160. Goetz & Scott, supra note 156, at 1011. 
161. See notes 122-28 supra and accompanying text. 
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toes. Suppose that B agrees to purchase 100 tons of fresh tomatoes 
from Sat $100 per ton. Swill realize a profit of $2,000 on the sale. S 
secures the produce, but B, a restaurateur, has suffered a financial set-
back and announces his intention to breach the contract. If the rou-
tine contract remedy is money damages, then S will be entitled to his 
expectancy, $2,000, plus any incidental costs incurred in trying to mit-
igate his losses by selling the tomatoes elsewhere.162 If the routine 
remedy is specific performance, then there is a fear that S will simply 
allow the tomatoes to rot or that, more likely, his incentive to resell 
them is less than is the case with money damages. Alternatively, spe-
cific performance may induce B to take delivery of the tomatoes, pay S 
$10,000, and attempt to resell them himself. If B is less advanta-
geously placed to resell than is S, then it might be argued that specific 
performance has created an inefficiency by placing the duty to cover 
on the party with the higher cover costs.163 
This inefficiency is illusory. B need not take delivery under specific 
performance, nor necessarily pay more in settlement to S than if a 
court awarded S his expectancy plus incidental expenses in reselling. 
If B would rather not be saddled with the costs of reselling the toma-
toes, then he can purchase S's right to enforce the contract from S for 
$2,000 plus S's costs of resale. This will satisfy S since he is, by defini-
tion, doing as well as if B fully performed.164 B is better off in paying 
this sum than in taking delivery if his resale costs are greater than S's. 
Note that this is precisely the outcome that would have resulted if 
money damages were the routine remedy. Thus, with regard to per-
ishable commodities, the result of a buyer's breach is the same 
whatever the contractual remedy. Neither remedy is more efficient 
than the other. This means that, even without a duty to mitigate 
under specific performance, the incentives facing both promisee and 
promisor will lead to a mitigation of the losses arising from the buyer's 
breach. 
When we tum to the duty to mitigate when the object of the 
breach is a nonperishable commodity, the issues become more com-
plex but the conclusion is the same. Consider a contract between L, a 
162. Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1979); U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1977). 
I mean to leave aside the complex questions of whether this seller has really suffered any loss in 
profits because of the buyer's breach. Let us assume that this is truly a case of lost-volume sales 
and, therefore, of lost profits. 
163. This point indicates the very close connection between the matter of relative cover costs, 
dealt with in the previous section, and mitigation. 
164. B may even pay Sa bit more than the sum mentioned. At $2000 plus the costs of resale, 
S would be indifferent between this sum and receiving specific performance. For a little more, S 
would prefer to sell his right to specific performance. See text at notes 39-40 infra. 
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landlord, and R, a renter, for the rental of L's property at a fixed 
monthly rate for a term of five years. After two years R finds it no 
longer profitable to continue the rental and announces his repudiation 
of the contract. Under a rule of money damages, L is entitled to his 
expectancy but has a duty to try to relet the property in order to miti-
gate his losses. Generally speaking, L may not simply bring an action 
to collect the remaining three-year's rent. Under the duty to mitigate 
L may recover any incidental expenses involved in reletting the prop-
erty plus the difference between the contract price and the new rental 
rate. 165 It is feared that under specific performance L will have no 
incentive to mitigate; instead, he will inefficiently hold R to the terms 
of the rental contract rather than making efforts to move his property 
to its next best use. 
It is not at all clear that even under money damages L's behavior 
will be different when he has a duty to mitigate than when the law 
imposes no such duty. That is, regardless of the contract remedy and 
of any duties imposed, L might want to try to mitigate his losses by re-
letting his property after R's breach. Assume that under legal relief L 
is entitled to the remaining three-years' payment on his contract and 
that there is no obligation on him to minimize his losses. R, who now 
faces the responsibility of paying the remainder of the contract, will 
attempt to relet the property himself, assuming that he is not pre-
vented from doing so by the terms of the contract. 166 R may not be 
able to relet the property as efficiently, i.e., as cheaply, as could the 
landlord. Nonetheless, with no duty on L to mitigate, R will attempt 
to mitigate his losses by reletting the property. It is even possible that, 
if L has an appreciable cost advantage in reletting the property, R will 
pay L something less than his cover costs but greater than L's cover 
costs to induce L to assume the duty to find another lessee. Both par-
ties would be better off under such an arrangement than if the ineffi-
cient party, R, were to attempt the reletting alone. 
What this means is that, even under money damages without a 
duty on the seller to mitigate, there are strong incentives for a mutu-
ally beneficial post-breach agreement between buyer and seller to mini-
mize the losses from breach.167 Precisely the same sort of conclusion 
165. BVA Credit Corp. v. Fisher, 369 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Industrial Leas-
ing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574, 532 P.2d 916 (1974). 
166. If there is such a restriction in the contract, then it is possible to infer that R voluntarily 
assumed the risk of being obliged to pay the entire rental term. Perhaps R received a lower 
rental rate in return for assuming this risk. Alternatively, he can, after the breach, purchase the 
right to relet from L. See text following note 168 infra. 
167. The possibility for a post-breach settlement leading to an efficient outcome is reminis-
cent of the argument that such a settlement will forestall the inefficient performance of a contract 
where there is a punitive liquidated damages clause. See text at notes 39-40 supra. 
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follows when the routine remedy is specific performance. If L is enti-
tled to that remedy, then after the breach he and R stand in relation to 
each other in exactly the same manner as they did under money dam-
ages without a duty on L to mitigate his losses. We saw there that a 
private settlement would minimize losses in precisely the manner envi-
sioned to occur through a legal duty to mitigate; hence it follows that 
under specific performance there will also be an incentive for L and R 
to minimize the losses from breach through a private negotiation that 
is indistinguishable from a legal duty to mitigate. 
Let us consider an extreme case: R has rented L's premises for five 
years under the condition that he use the property only as a saloon; 
furthermore, he is forbidden to sublet the premises during the term of 
the lease. 168 After two years, the county in which R has been operat-
ing his saloon suddenly and unexpectedly makes the sale of alcoholic 
beverages illegal. R breaches his contract with L, and L sues for spe-
cific performance. Under that remedy, might it not be the case that R 
will be inefficiently bound to pay L the remaining three-years' rental? 
Although R has no right to sublet, he does have at his disposal the 
opportunity to buy from L the right to enforce the decree of specific 
performance. Clearly, L will not sell that right for less than R is 
obliged to pay him under the contract. Consider the possibility that R 
paid a lower than market rental rate for L's property precisely because 
L insisted on the limitations that it not be sublet and that it be used 
only as a saloon. Suppose that without those restrictions the monthly 
rent would have been $600, but that with them it was $500. Under 
specific performance L is entitled to a stream of income of $500/ 
month for another three years. Only if R is able to pay him more than 
that will L consent to release him from specific performance on the 
original contract. There is every reason to believe that R will pay him, 
say, $550 per month in return for L's waiving the restrictions on sub-
letting and use of the premises for another purpose. R will be willing 
to pay that increased amount if there is an alternative use of the prop-
erty that makes the payment of $550 per month profitable to him. 
In conclusion, the alternative contract remedies are equally effi-
cient as regards the incentive to mitigate the seller's losses in the case 
of buyer's breach. A choice between legal and equitable relief may, 
therefore, be made on the basis of the other attributes discussed above. 
168. See, e.g., Peterson v. Jefferson County, 372 So. 2d 839 (Ala. 1979); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 
Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 25 Cal. 2d 45, 153 P.2d 53 (1944). 
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5. Consequential Damages 
One of the common rules in assessing contract damages is that the 
innocent party is not, in general, entitled to collect for his consequent-
ial damages.169 The rule derives from the doctrine of foreseeability of 
contract damages enunciated in the celebrated case of Hadley v. Bax-
endale. 170 That doctrine holds that the breacher is to be held liable 
only for the reasonably foreseeable losses arising from his breach, un-
less he was notified of and agreed to accept liability for remote 
damages.111 
The economic rationale for this rule is that the breachee is likely to 
be a better insurer against or preventer of certain remote losses than is 
the breacher.172 For example, consider a person who has funds trans-
ferred to his United States bank account electronically from over-
seas.173 Due to an error on the part of the transmitting bank, the 
funds arrive after an unanticipated delay. As a result, the person ex-
pecting the transfer misses the deadline for the purchase of tickets to 
an event for which he has an extremely high subjective valuation. He 
sues for breach and asks for the extraordinary losses - the difference 
between his subjective valuation of the tickets and the actual ticket 
prices. Assuming that the breach is not excusable, the court will allow 
the recovery of only the ticket prices, not the extraordinary losses. 
The reason is. that the transferor had no way of foreseeing the very 
large losses of the transferee. Indeed, if the law were to hold the trans-
feror liable for all the losses of the transferee, then transferors would 
increase their prices to reflect this increased risk of doing business. 
This result would be inefficient in that all customers would be obliged 
to contribute to this loss insurance. It would be less costly to relieve 
those with only ordinary losses from the cost of contributing to this 
169. Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., most states held that consequential damages were 
awarded only if the seller knew of the buyer's purpose in making the purchase and if no substi-
tute good would be available in the event of the seller's breach. Marcus & Co. v. K.L.G. Baking 
Co., 122 NJ.L. 202, 3 A.2d 627 (1939). U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1977) maintains the common law 
requirements, providing that the seller must pay consequential damages for "any loss resulting 
from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting 
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." See 
also United Cal. Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 945, 966-72 (D. Mass. 
1982), affd. mem., 105 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1983). Some commentators suggest that the standard 
under the U.C.C. relaxes the requirement of foreseeability. See J. CALAMARI & 1. PERILLO, 
CoNTRACTS 551-53 (2d ed. 1977). 
170. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
171. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 351 (1979); J. CALAMARI & 1. PERILLO, 
supra note 169, at 523-26. 
172. R. POSNER, supra note l, at 94. Note the close connection between consequential dam-
ages, the issue of relative cover costs, and the doctrine of Initigation. 
173. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1017 (1982). 
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special insurance fund and instead to place the full cost of insurance 
against extraordinary losses on the few who anticipate such losses. 
Because there is an efficiency reason for limiting a breachee's losses 
to those that are reasonably foreseeable, the question arises as to 
whether this limitation will be preserved under specific performance as 
the routine remedy. At first blush, there would appear to be no such 
limitation: the breachee, in his post-breach negotiations, would seek 
to recover all his losses, foreseeable or not. Without limitation im-
posed by the court, specific performance would seem to lead to the 
possibility of the innocent party's inefficiently recovering too much. 
This conclusion would be incorrect. First, while it might be true 
that in the initial instances of awards of specific performance as the 
routine remedy the breachee would press for more than he would have 
recovered under money damages as tempered by foreseeability or a 
duty to mitigate, this over-recovery would not persist for future con-
tracting parties. If it were known that the breachee could, under spe-
cific performance, hold out for foreseeable and extraordinary losses, 
then a limitation would likely become a part of the contract itself, 
either in the form of a waiver of liability for consequential damages174 
or as specified in a liquidated damages clause.175 Bargaining at con-
tract formation time about either of those alternatives would lead to 
an efficient assignment of liability: if the potential breacher were the 
superior risk-bearer for all the potential breachee's losses, he should be 
willing to assume liability for all losses in exchange for a slightly 
higher contract price. If, on the other hand, the breachee is better 
placed to insure against or prevent some but not all losses, then re-
sponsibility for those different types of loss should be exchanged in a 
value-maximizing way.176 
Second, the situation in which the breachee recovers both foresee-
able and extraordinary losses under specific performance is never 
likely to arise. This is because, in the situation in which losses have 
already been incurred and there is no physical way in which perfor-
mance can be completed by the breacher, specific performance would 
not be a viable remedy.177 Money damages will have to do. Consider 
174. Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ct. App. 1980); 
Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1972). 
175. See the discussion ofliquidated damages as a form of insurance for legally uncompensa-
ble subjective losses at note 122 supra and accompanying text. 
176. See Schwartz & Wilde, Impelfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Ex-
amples of Warranties and Security Interests. 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1398-99 (1983); Priest, supra 
note 12, at 66-71. 
-177. See the discussion of impossibility as a defense to an action for specific performance at 
note 121 supra and accompanying text. 
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the case of the electronic transfer of funds again. The damage there 
has already been done; specific performance would be meaningless. 
Thus, the complaint will be for money damages, and the court can 
then impose the efficient limitations on the foreseeability of the losses 
and on the breachee's duty to mitigate his losses. 
D. Defenses 
When, under current law, an aggrieved contractual party asks for 
specific performance, the defendant is allowed to invoke certain de-
fenses that would not normally be available if the innocent party were 
asking for money damages. He may claim an inadequacy of consider-
ation, 178 a lack of sufficient security for the promisee's performance, 179 
and unilateral mistake by the promisor.180 There is no sound eco-
nomic reason for any of these defenses in the economic analysis of 
contract law.181 Since none of them have found favor as formation 
defenses, there is no good reason to offer them to defendants for use in 
178. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 169, at 589 (specific performance will generally 
be denied if consideration is merely nominal, even if it would be sufficient to support a contract at 
law). In some jurisdictions the defense is statutory. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3391 (West 
1970); Lamb v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 33, 129 P.2d 371 (1942). See also In re Estate 
ofBrown, 130 Ill. App. 2d 514, 264 N.E.2d 287 (1970) (allowing inadequacy of consideration as 
a defense when there has also been procedural unfairness in the formation of the contract). 
179. See, e.g., Carmen v. Gunn, 198 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); CALAMARI & 
PERILLO, supra note 169, at 589; REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 363 (1979). 
180. Clayburg v. Whitt, 171 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1969); Damazo v. Neal, 32 Md. App. 536, 
363 A.2d 252 (1976); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 169, at 594-95. 
181. Those engaged in the economic analysis of the law have, in general, favored the bargain 
theory of consideration, in which the adequacy of consideration is to be left to the subjective 
judgment of the contracting parties. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LA ws OP 
ENGLAND 440 (1776) ("[i]n case ofleases, always reserving a rent, though it be but a peppercorn: 
any of which consideration will, in the eye of the law, convert the gift . • ., if not executed, into a 
contract"); see also Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), and R. POSNER, 
supra note 1, at 69-71. The reason that economic analysis favors this theory, rather than one that 
stresses an objective measure of the adequacy of consideration, is that the theory of consumer 
choice in modem microeconomic theory is based on the notion of purely subjective individual 
tastes. In this theory consumer preferences are measured on an ordinal, not cardinal, scale of 
utility so that interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made. That means that modem 
microeconomic theory recognizes no objective standard for comparing the strength of preference 
or tastes among consumers. With regard to the matter of remedies for breach of contract, this 
suggests that there is no basis in economic theory for inquiring into the adequacy of considera-
tion. And even if there were, there is certainly nothing about the particular form of relief for 
which the innocent party prays that justifies a court's investigating the adequacy of consideration 
when specific performance is sought but not inquiring into that adequacy where legal relief is 
sought. 
The issue of whether there was sufficient security for the promisee's performance could be 
analyzed similarly. First, the adequacy of security is a matter best left to the contracting parties' 
judgment at the time the contract is formed. Second, there is no apparent reason for a court's 
considering the adequacy of security when equitable relief is sought but not when legal relief is 
sought. 
Finally, neither traditional legal analysis nor economic analysis favors excusing a promiser's 
performance because of his unilateral mistake. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 71-74. That being 
so, it is inconceivable that a case could be made for excusing specific performance on the grounds 
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specific performance actions.182 I shall not discuss these. 
There are two additional defenses, however, to which there is some 
economic content: difficulty of supervision183 and impossibility. Let 
us tum to a discussion of the efficiency of these two defenses. 
1. Impossibility 
The most obvious limitation on the routine award of specific per-
formance in breach of contract is the case of physical impossibility.184 
In the economic literature on contracts, impossibility as a performance 
defense has been analyzed as a device for encouraging the efficient al-
location of risk among contracting parties.185 It has not been recog-
nized that impossibility also bears upon the design of efficient contract 
remedies. 
When performance by the breacher is literally impossible, eco-
nomic efficiency is not served by awarding the breachee specific per-
formance. Specific performance is, in those circumstances, of infinite 
worth: it is the sum for which a promisee to whom the court has 
awarded specific performance will sell his right to have the contract 
enforced. Consider the case in which a resort owner has lured clients 
to his island by promising them lots of sun and warm weather. In-
stead, there is lots of rain and cold. Assuming that there has been a 
breach of contract, 186 specific performance is meaningless in those cir-
cumstances. Money damages will have to suffice to protect the expec-
tancy of the clients.181 
of unilateral mistake if the promisee asks for specific performance but not if he asks for money 
damages. 
The only consistent thread that runs through the extraordinary defenses allowed a promiser 
to a decree of specific performance is one that sees these defenses as raising the cost to the 
innocent promisee of seeking specific performance and, thus, of discouraging him from praying 
for that form of relief. 
182. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 296. A concurring inference may be drawn from R. 
POSNER, supra note l, at 95. 
183. See, e.g., Dover Shopping Center, Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 384, 164 
A.2d 785 (1960); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 366 comment a (1979); SA A. 
CORBIN, supra note 115, at §§ 1171, 1172; Van Hecke, supra note 112, at 13-16. 
184. For the sake of convenience, I include under impossibility the case of involuntary 
breach. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977) for the doctrine of commercial impracticability. See also 
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978); REsTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-469 comment a (1932). 
185. R. POSNER, supra note l, at 74-9; see also Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Re-
lated Doctrines in Contract Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-92, 97-108 (1977). 
186. This is a strong assumption. The usual manner in which this hypothetical would be 
treated is as an instance of fraud. If the resort owner made a fraudulent misrepresentation of the 
weather, then the contract was invalidly formed, in which case the appropriate remedy is recis-
sion and restitution. 
187. In general, economists have not looked favorably on the defense of commercial imprac-
ticability. See, e.g., Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westing-
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2. High Supervisory Costs 
One of the most troubling issues in making specific performance 
the routine remedy for breach of contract is that there may be circum-
stances in which the costs to the court of supervising the performance 
of the breacher may be inefficiently high.188 There may be a very high 
probability of noncompliance, owing, perhaps, to the breacher's hav-
ing forcefully and convincingly indicated his refusal to comply. The 
court might find that, under those conditions, it will need to incur 
extraordinarily large expenses in order that the breacher be held to his 
promise. The prestige of the court is in some jeopardy and may be 
damaged in those circumstances; this fact should be taken into ac-
count in figuring the costs of specific performance.189 
Alternatively, the performance contemplated may be so complex 
as to defy effective supervision. Suppose that A contracts with B to 
play Hamlet at B's theater and subsequently A refuses to perform. A 
court will not give B a decree requiring A to act. 190 It is no doubt true 
that the costs to the court of judging whether, after B has received a 
specific performance decree, A had discharged his contractual obliga-
tion, including the quality of his performance, are extraordinarily 
high. For example, how should the court assure the quality of A's 
performance as the Prince of Denmark? Perhaps because A is in such 
a pique about his dispute with B he might, without stringent supervi-
sion by the court, seek to embarrass B by the shoddiness of his Ham-
let. But how far should the court go? Should it specify gestures, 
grimaces, smiles, tones of declamation? The problem is a real one that 
the design of efficient remedies must seriously confront. 
The contention is, in part, that high supervision costs will increase 
the costs of using specific performance as the routine remedy to the 
point that money damages are more attractive. Consider, for example, 
that if defendants know that they may be relieved of specific perform-
ance when they are able to demonstrate high supervision costs, then 
they have an incentive to raise that defense in cases where it may be 
inappropriate. Since this would, in general, raise the costs of litigation, 
it might make the otherwise more efficient remedy of specific perfor-
house Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 162-63 (1977). With regard to the concerns raised here, the 
defense of commercial impracticability, if it is not allowed, does not, like physical impossibility, 
mean that an award of specific performance is of infinite worth. It merely means that, as with 
any award of specific performance, the defendant will have to pay for the plaintifrs expectation 
losses as determined in a post-litigation bargain between the litigants. 
188. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 comment a (1979); see also Rubin, 
supra note 36, at 246. 
189. 5A A. CoRBIN, supra note 115, §§ 1171, 1172. 
190. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 367(1) (1979). 
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mance more expensive and, therefore, less clearly efficient than money 
damages. A further contention is that since a far wider set of con-
tracts than is commonly assumed involve high supervision costs, spe-
cific performance is inappropriate as the routine contract remedy. 
While there is something creditable to this criticism, it must be 
carefully considered. For this criticism of specific performance to hold 
true, high supervision costs must attend a large number of contracts, 
and money damages must be the most efficient means of resolving the 
breach of those contracts. Neither of these matters can be 
demonstrated. 
First, the set of contracts in which supervisory costs are most 
likely to be high may be a relatively small class of contracts. The Re-
statement makes a point of excluding from relief by specific perfor-
mance contracts for personal services, presumably on the grounds that 
for those contracts a court's supervisory costs are high. Yet for nearly 
every other sort of contract, there is little reason to believe that the 
court faces high supervisory costs. Thus, at first blush, it would make 
economic sense to make specific performance the routine remedy ex-
cept in those cases, like personal service contracts, where supervisory 
costs are likely to be high.191 
Second, even where supervisory costs are likely to be high, the inef-
ficiencies that would follow from granting specific performance are ex-
aggerated. There are two reasons for this: the contract may never be 
performed, and if it is, the promisor's regard for his professional repu-
tation and future employability will temper the incentive to mis-
perform the contract. 
The presumption that an award of specific performance will neces-
sarily result in performance of the contract is incorrect. We have seen 
above that specific performance, like injunctive relief, should be under-
stood as an instruction to the litigants to use the market, rather than 
the court, to solve their dispute. There is every reason to believe that if 
B is awarded a decree of specific performance against A to play Ham-
let, the two will begin negotiations to resolve the dispute, with A pre-
191. Consider this further example. A couple, C:: finds that although the wife is capable of 
becoming pregnant, she is not able to carry the fetus to term. The couple form a contract with 
M, a surrogate mother, who agrees to have the couple's fertilized egg implanted in her womb, to 
carry the fetus to term, to deliver the child, and then to turn the baby over to C Imagine, first, 
the complexities of specifying in a contract and negotiating over the relevant contingencies and 
actions to be taken in the event of those contingencies coming to pass. Imagine, further, the 
issues that arise if M declares her intention to breach and C then sues. Assuming that the court 
finds M in breach of the contract, are the costs of determining and awarding C their expectancy 
loss in money damages greater or less than the supervision costs of enforcing specific perform-
ance? For a lucid and thoughtful discussion of these and related issues, see L. ANDREWS, NEW 
CoNCEPTIONS 226-33 (1984). 
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sumably willing to pay B not to exercise his right to the contractual 
promise. B, for his part, may be willing to exchange that right rather 
than run the risk of incurring large expenses in policing A's portrayal 
of Hamlet. That is, it may be mutually beneficial to promisor and 
promisee to bargain out of performance. Although it is difficult to 
know a priori when this will happen, the possibility that there will be 
no performance in circumstances in which supervision costs of the 
performance would be high should lessen the concern about the ineffi-
ciencies that might result. Indeed, it may be that the proper way to 
consider the problem of high supervision costs is not that it puts ex-
traordinary burdens on the legal system but rather that it merely gives 
the breacher a much better bargaining position in the post-breach ne-
gotiations than would be the case under a contract in which the qual-
ity of the breacher's performance was not solely in the breacher's 
hands. If that is the proper economic analysis of the matter of high 
supervision costs, then it may well be that specific performance is the 
preferred remedy there, too. Assuming that the promisor makes a 
credible threat that supervising the quality of his performance will be 
high, then the worst that can happen to the promisee is that he ac-
cepts, in return for not enforcing his right to specific performance, a 
price that reflects the contract price less the anticipated supervision 
costs. Such a conclusion would serve as an inducement for future con-
tracts regarding personal services, or other high supervisory cost activ-
ities, to include liquidation clauses specifying responsibility for the 
costs of monitoring performance. Alternatively, promisees in situa-
tions of high supervision costs will discount the contract price they are 
willing to give ~ promisor by the probability of breach and by the level 
of anticipated supervision costs.192 
Even if there is no exchange of the right to performance results, 
the force of competition may temper the defendant's urge to mis-
perform in some manner. A, for example, must take care for his future 
employability on the stage - with other promoters, if not necessarily 
B - and this fact may spur him to produce as creditable a Hamlet as 
if he were acting for the sheer love of it, rather than under threat of 
contempt of court.193 
Thirdly, and lastly, the high supervisory costs of equitable relief 
192. Rubin, supra note 36, at 243-46, argued that specific performance should not be the 
routine remedy for breach because it is not a self-enforcing remedy and it imposes costs on the 
public which should be better placed on the contracting parties. He was especially concerned 
about high supervision costs but did not recognize the possibility that this matter could be ade-
quately internalized. 
193. See the discussion of how reputation as a market force may lead to breach only where it 
is more efficient to breach than to perform at text at notes 17-23 supra. 
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are objectionable in large part because they are incurred at public ex-
pense.194 This objection would be mitigated if the costs were borne by 
the litigants, not by taxpayers in general. The use of court-appointed 
special masters to oversee equitable decrees is one means of achieving 
this privatization, but one that, despite its attraction to economists, 
does not find much favor in the legal fraternity. 195 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The contention of this paper is that remedies for breach of contract 
are not now entirely consistent with the goal of economic efficiency. 
The routine remedy is the awarding of money damages, whereas eco-
nomic efficiency considerations urge specific performance as the rou-
tine remedy. Following Calabresi and Melamed's analysis of legal and 
equitable remedies in nuisance law, I propose that the efficient ex-
change of mutually beneficial promises would be better served by us-
ing the level of transaction costs as the guide for choosing a contract 
remedy: if transaction costs are low between the defaulter and the 
innocent party, then an award of specific performance will encourage 
the parties to exchange the right to performance voluntarily and effi-
ciently; if, however, those costs are so high that no voluntary exchange 
can take place, then the court should intervene and compel an ex-
change at a collectively determined price; that is, the court should 
award money damages. Since it is most likely to be the case that par-
ties to a contract have low transaction costs in that they, unlike, say, 
tortfeasors and their victims, have already established a relationship, 
courts should presume that specific performance is to be awarded, 
with money damages being tl?-e exceptional award. This is precisely 
the opposite of current practice. 
The contention that specific performance will greatly increase ad-
ministration costs or post-breach negotiations costs has been shown to 
be inaccurate. By comparison to the award of expectation damages, 
the court costs of specific performance are much less and much more 
accurate in protecting the breachee's expectancy. There is no less an 
incentive to mitigate the innocent party's losses under specific per-
formance than there is under efficient money damages. Nor will con-
sequential damages be inefficiently captured under specific 
194. This was the thrust of Professor Rubin's criticism of specific performance. See Rubin, 
supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
195. FED. R. C1v. P. 53(b) states that the use of a special master "shall be the exception and 
not the rule." See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 279-84. See generally Brazil, Referring Discovery 
Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 83 AM. B. FOUND. 
REsEARCH J. 143 (1983). 
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performance where they are efficiently excluded under legal relief. 
Lastly, there are two valid defenses to an action for specific perfor-
mance: impossibility of performance and high supervision costs. I 
have argued, however, that even high supervision costs are not a nec-
essary or sufficient condition for not awarding specific performance. 
This is because there are factors that lessen the inefficiencies of equita-
ble relief in cases where supervision costs are most likely to be high: 
viz., the breacher's regard for his reputation and the possibility that it 
may be more efficient for the parties to bargain out of performance of 
the contract than to risk high supervision costs, even if those are to be 
paid out of the public fisc. Additionally, specific performance should 
be imposed in instances of high supervision costs if, through the use of 
special masters, the cost of supervision can be shifted to the litigants 
and away from the public. 
Finally, I wish to stress that what has been laid out here is, I be-
lieve, a logically consistent hypothesis that specific performance 
should be the routine contract remedy if the goal of contract law is to 
promote the economically efficient exchange of mutually beneficial 
promises. This is, thus far, no more than, I trust, a very persuasive 
hypothesis. It is not a settled conclusion. It would be overly hasty to 
reform the law before seeing whether this hypothesis withstands a con-
frontation with the relevant facts. Among many other things, we need 
to know the relative transaction costs of court versus private settle-
ment of breached promises and whether contractual behavior would 
become more efficient if those exchanging promises knew that the rou-
tine remedy were specific performance. We need to know what sorts 
of disputes about contract breach are brought to court: do they con-
cern only particular types of commodities or all types? Are they, for 
example, goods whose elasticity of supply is low or goods whose cross-
price elasticity of demand is low? With regard to awards, what per-
centage is damages? What percentage is specific performance? Do 
courts usually award expectation loss, or do they use some other stan-
dard, and, if so, why? 
The law and economics literature has grown so extensive that it 
has offered a tremendously important and staggeringly large number 
of hypotheses. The empirical research agenda in the field is one of the 
most exciting in all of the social sciences. Given the well-known diffi-
culties involved in working with court records, 196 this empirical work 
will not be easy. That does not, however, excuse its not going forward. 
One possibility is a comparison of the disposition of breach of contract 
196. See Priest & Klein, supra note 126, at 2-5. 
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cases in common law and civil law countries. Another possibility may 
be to adopt the methods of experimental economics to test the numer-
ous, complex hypotheses about behavior under alternative legal 
rules.191 
197. For a general survey of the techniques and conclusions of experimental economics, see 
Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science, 72 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 923 (1982). A 
recent survey of the small and growing literature on the use of experimental techniques in the 
economic analysis oflaw is Hoffman & Spritzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduc-
• tion, CoLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming). See also, for a particular example, Grether, Schwartz & 
Wilde, Experimental Tests of Imperfect Infonnation, California Institute of Technology Social 
Science Working Paper (1984). 
